



October 2026

Briefing for UNFCCC COP31 on Environmental Human Rights Defenders (EHRDs)

Recommendations for advancing climate justice through increased participation, recognition and protection of EHRDs

This submission was initiated by: ACE Observatory; Alliance for Land, Indigenous and Environmental Defenders (ALLIED); Amnesty International, Asia Pacific Network of Environmental Defenders (APNED); Asuntos del Sur; CambiaMO; Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL); CIVICUS; Conectas Direitos Humanos; European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL); Global Citizen; Global Witness; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL); International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; ILC Secretariat; Knowledge Alliance for Environmental Defenders (KALLIED); Natural Justice.

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Environmental human rights defenders (EHRDs) play critical roles in advancing just responses to climate change. Some progress has been made, including in UNFCCC processes, in recognizing the essential role of EHRDs and promoting their effective participation in climate decision-making, but in too many respects, climate processes remain inaccessible to EHRDs and fail to recognize and protect them. The upcoming COP31 presents an important opportunity to address these deficits. In the briefing note that follows, we describe the context and present core recommendations for elevating the voices and recognition of EHRDs with respect to general access and rights of participation, and in five key UNFCCC processes: (1) the Gender Action Plan; (2) Global Stocktake; (3) Action for Climate Empowerment; (4) Just Transition and Action Mechanism (BAM); and (5) Global Goal on Adaptation. Those core recommendations can be summarized as follows:

Summary of recommendations

1. Access and the right to participation

The COP31 Co-Presidency (Türkiye and Australia) should:

- Demonstrate commitment to fulfilling human rights obligations by protecting civic space, ending reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society representatives, and ensuring that participants and human rights defenders can exercise their rights without fear of intimidation, reprisals or gender-based violence before, during and after COP31.
- Guarantee that human rights defenders can freely express themselves and peacefully assemble inside and outside the COP Venue, as guaranteed by international standards related to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.
- Keep negotiations open to observers wherever permitted and ensure accessible accreditation and timely and equitable visa processes for human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, particularly from high-risk countries.

The UNFCCC Secretariat should:

- Adopt a zero-tolerance policy on intimidation, harassment and reprisals against observers, and designate a focal point to receive, monitor and follow up on reports of reprisals linked to participation in UNFCCC processes.



- Develop and publish, well in advance of COPs, host country agreements with clear human rights principles and criteria, including guarantees for freedom of peaceful assembly, association and expression, as protected under international law.

Parties should:

- Recognize the link between the climate crisis and growing violence, criminalization and repression against land and environmental defenders, and take meaningful steps to protect environmental human rights defenders and civic space online and offline.
- Carry the rights-based language agreed in Belém into all COP31 decisions, including references to environmental human rights defenders, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the rights of Indigenous Peoples including FPIC.

The COP31 Co-Presidency, the UNFCCC Secretariat and Parties should:

- Ensure transparency in badge allocation and quotas, regional balance in accreditation, and prioritized speaking slots for Indigenous Peoples, local communities and environmental human rights defenders.
- Keep negotiating rooms, including informal consultations, open to observers wherever permitted.
- Remove practical barriers to participation, including timely and predictable visa processing; financial support for participation from underrepresented regions and high-risk countries; and reliable hybrid participation options for those who cannot travel safely, built around the connectivity and digital literacy levels participants in different regions of the world actually have.
- Implement a special digital visa system for all accredited participants to all UNFCCC meetings, guaranteed to be available within one week of application.
- Advance an accountability framework on conflicts of interest, extending disclosure of affiliation and funding requirements to all participants, including Party delegations, and limiting the influence of those whose business models drive the harms defenders resist.
- Establish a regular, formal space for dialogue between Parties, the Presidencies and environmental human rights defenders, building on the recommendation in our COP28 briefing for a dedicated dialogue on defenders under the UNFCCC.

2. Implementation of the Gender Action Plan (GAP)

- Prioritize GAP deliverables on women environmental defenders, including protection guidelines, with a clear timeline, designated responsible actors, and resources.
- Involve women defenders directly in designing these guidelines and provide resources to enable their organizations to participate.
- Translate gender-responsive climate finance commitments into accessible, direct, and grant-based funding for women-led and community-led organizations.

3. Global Stocktake

- Gather evidence during the information collection phase on how climate action has respected, protected and fulfilled human rights, including the rights of environmental human rights defenders.
- Invite and reflect inputs from defenders' networks, Indigenous Peoples' organizations, the OHCHR, and UN and regional Special Procedures, and guarantee safe participation in the technical dialogues.
- Ensure the GST2 outcome guides Parties on integrating protection of environmental human rights defenders, civic space, participation and access to information into their next NDCs.

4. Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) and its new Action Plan

- Ensure that activities under the public participation and access to information elements (including on countering climate mis- and disinformation) explicitly address the enabling environment for civil



society and the protection of environmental human rights defenders, including women defenders and Indigenous and Afro-descendant defenders.

- Recognize environmental human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and civil society organizations as implementers of ACE, and provide dedicated, accessible funding for their participation and their education, training, and awareness-raising work.
- Invite Parties to report, through their ACE national focal points and national communications, on barriers to participation and access to information that environmental human rights defenders face, including attacks, criminalization and reprisals, and steps taken towards the recognition of their role as climate actors and their protection.
- Mandate an interactive workshop as part of the ACE Dialogues, with a view to enabling the sharing of experience and resources in relation to facilitating inclusive participation for all members of society, with a specific focus on environmental human rights defenders in developing and implementing ACE activities at all levels.
- Strengthen coherence between ACE and other tracks, including the Belém Gender Action Plan activities on women environmental defenders, the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, and national implementation of regional agreements on access rights such as the Escazú Agreement and the Aarhus Convention.
- Ensure that the design and implementation of the new action plan is informed by the submissions of defenders' networks and that its implementation is monitored with disaggregated information on who is being reached.

5. Just Transition and Action Mechanism (BAM)

- Anchor the BAM's purpose, functioning and guiding principles in the full list of human rights safeguards agreed in Paragraph 12 of Decision 2/CMA.7, with the BAM set up as a constituted body under the UNFCCC to ensure just transition principles thoroughly inform the CMA and COP's other work strands.
- Provide for governance, institutional and knowledge-creation processes in the BAM that centre meaningful and formal roles for environmental human rights defenders, rightsholder constituencies – including workers, children, young people, feminist and gender advocates, Indigenous Peoples, and civil society more broadly – as well as groups in situations of marginalisation and local communities.
- Guarantee the BAM's accessibility and non-discrimination, including child, disability, and gender responsiveness, in accordance with human rights norms and principles.
- Ensure social dialogue with the full and meaningful inclusion of labor rights defenders working on a just transition, regardless of their employment status, and trade unions, in alignment with the ILO Guidelines on the matter.
- Explicitly respect and promote the rights and ancestral knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, including through the application of FPIC as well as precautionary and no-contact principles, and advance protective measures such as no-go approaches that prevent top-down harmful activities in Indigenous territories.
- Include functions to provide technical assistance, guidance, and capacity-building on human rights norms and standards – including on the rights of specific groups at risk of marginalization and high-risk sectors –, human rights due diligence, public participation and community-led collective protection and transition pathways.
- Establish safeguards, accountability and an accessible grievance mechanism, together with a clear policy against reprisals for those who engage with the mechanism or raise concerns about projects it supports.
- Ensure that the review of the Just Transition Work Programme assesses the participation of environmental human rights defenders, civil society from all rightsholder groups, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and addresses barriers to their safe engagement.



6. Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

- Agree the composition and working modalities of the technical taskforce so that it provides for the meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, children, youth, women and knowledge holders, including through the rights-based constituencies and bodies such as the Indigenous Peoples Caucus, the Disability Caucus and the Women and Gender Constituency as well as the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, alongside technical experts.
- Ensure that guidance developed under the Belém–Addis Vision addresses governance and enabling conditions, including public participation, access to information and justice, FPIC, land and tenure security and the safety of communities and defenders engaged in adaptation.
- Encourage disaggregation of indicator data by social groups, including Indigenous Peoples, people of African descent, small-scale farmers, women and youth, so that adaptation progress can be assessed for those most exposed.
- Resolve the means of implementation and the tripling of adaptation finance, ensuring support reaches the community level and that indicators are not used to condition access to finance.
- Ensure the 2029 review of the UAE Framework and the indicators draws on evidence from affected communities and environmental human rights defenders, not only from national reporting systems.
- Ensure that the Belém–Addis Vision and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap reinforce, rather than fragment, the adaptation architecture, with clear mandates, links to constituted bodies and work programmes, and meaningful participation of developing countries, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and rights-based constituencies.
- Build convergence on the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, Belém–Addis Vision, and the technical task force.
- Ensure that the Belém–Addis Vision develops sufficiently robust and comparable guidance, metadata and methodologies to make the indicators meaningful for tracking adaptation progress, while respecting the voluntary, country-driven nature of the framework and avoiding additional reporting burdens.
- Ensure that related adaptation items at COP31 – assessment of progress on National Adaptation Plans, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the Global Implementation Accelerator – examine whether adaptation planning has been participatory and whether FPIC and tenure rights were respected, and include civil society, Indigenous Peoples and local communities in their delivery.



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Context

Rights-based climate action is more effective climate action

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), the latest completed assessment, sets out the scientific case for rights-based climate action. The IPCC finds, with high confidence, that climate resilient development is facilitated when governments at all levels work with communities and civil society and develop partnerships with traditionally marginalised groups, including women, youth, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and ethnic minorities¹. The IPCC also finds that inclusive governance processes are among the enabling conditions for adaptation, that maladaptation can be avoided through flexible, inclusive and long-term planning, and that vulnerability is driven by inequity, marginalisation and historical and ongoing patterns such as colonialism². In its Synthesis Report, the IPCC concludes that adaptation and mitigation actions prioritising equity, social justice, climate justice, rights-based approaches and inclusivity lead to more sustainable outcomes, reduce trade-offs and support transformative change³.

All Parties to the Paris Agreement have international human rights obligations and have committed, in the context of climate action, to respect, promote and fulfil them. Human Rights Council Resolution 40/11 recognises the contribution of environmental human rights defenders (EHRDs) to the enjoyment of human rights, environmental protection and sustainable development⁴. The United Nations defines EHRDs as individuals and groups who, peacefully and in a personal or professional capacity, work to protect and promote human rights relating to the environment, including water, air, land, flora and fauna.⁵

The IPCC is now in its seventh assessment cycle. The Special Report on Climate Change and Cities is scheduled for approval and publication in March 2027, the three Working Group contributions to AR7 are in preparation, and the AR7 Synthesis Report is expected by late 2029⁶. There is an open question on whether the Working Group contributions will be available in time for the second Global Stocktake in 2028⁷. In this context, evidence and knowledge brought directly by EHRDs, Indigenous Peoples and local communities to the UNFCCC process remain crucial.

Defenders face continuing violence but remain steadfast

Around the world, people are resisting harm to their rights and land and standing firm against the governments and private actors collectively and individually responsible for the climate crisis. They are fighting for the right to live with dignity, safety, and in a healthy environment.

Despite international commitments to human rights and environmental protection, defending human rights and the environment, including opposing fossil fuel projects, remains dangerous and carries personal risks in many countries. As their demands challenge powerful economic and political interests, many defenders have been stigmatized, threatened, attacked, and criminalized.

All too often, land and environmental defenders continue to pay with their lives to protect their lands, territories, natural resources, and communities. Global Witness's latest annual report verified the killings of at least 124 land and environmental defenders in 2025, bringing the total number of killings and disappearances documented by Global Witness since 2012 to 2,375.⁸

Killings are the most extreme form of reprisal and occur within a broader pattern of non-lethal attacks, including criminalization and judicial harassment, SLAPPs, restrictive legislation on assembly and on civil society funding, smear campaigns, surveillance, coordinated online harassment and disinformation campaigns, and sexual and other forms of gender-based violence used to deter dissent.⁹

Despite the risks and losses they face, defenders continue to organize, mobilize, and act against threats to their rights, livelihoods, and territories, and for a better future. From a polluted bay in Brazil to threatened Indigenous territories in Australia and Canada, from gas flares in Ecuador and coal mining in Türkiye, Amnesty

1. IPCC, AR6 Working Group II, [Summary for Policymakers Headline Statements | Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability](#).

2. IPCC, AR6 Working Group II, Summary for Policymakers, headline statements C.5, C.4 and B.2 (see note above).

3. IPCC, [AR6 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers Headline Statements](#), C.2.5.

4. UN Human Rights Council, [Resolution 40/11 \(2019\)](#).

5. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, [Report A/71/281 \(2016\)](#); UNEP, ["Who are environmental defenders?"](#).

6. IPCC, ["Seventh Assessment Report"](#); IPCC, ["IPCC wraps up 64th plenary session in Bangkok"](#), 27 March 2026.

7. IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin, [IPCC-64 summary, 24–27 March 2026](#).

8. Global Witness, [Collective power: The struggle for protection for land and environmental defenders](#), 16 September 2026,

9. See some examples in [Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders \(FIDH-OMCT\)'s submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to a healthy environment \(2026\)](#).



International has reported how EHRDs are resisting fossil fuel infrastructure and fighting other root causes of the climate crisis.¹⁰ Burning coal, gas, and oil not only emits heat-trapping greenhouse gases, the primary driver of climate change, but also erodes the integrity of the nearby land, air, and waters on which people live and rely. Fossil fuel infrastructure itself also poses risks for the health and livelihoods of at least 2 billion people globally who live near fossil fuel infrastructure – roughly a quarter of the world’s population.¹¹ In light of this context, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) has analyzed why and in what ways it is crucial that transition pathways genuinely protect human rights, EHRDs and communities.¹²

In Türkiye, host of COP31, an environmental engineer has joined local communities opposing coal mining operations in Muğla province in south-western Türkiye for more than 25 years, supporting legal interventions, campaigning, and mobilization efforts. Led by villagers, particularly women from İkizköy, their struggle has sought to protect the Akbelen Forest, a symbol of resistance to coal-mining expansion, and the region’s olive grove, both vital to local livelihoods. Over the years, this person has been subject to multiple criminal investigations and prosecutions for her peaceful environmental activism.¹³

EHRDs are leading the way towards a more sustainable, just and fossil-free future. They speak out against fossil fuel exploitation and other extractive activities that threaten people and the environment. EHRDs are demonstrating true climate leadership, and their right to defend a healthy environment must be protected alongside their rights to life, physical integrity, and freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. Authorities must also guarantee their right to participate meaningfully in decision-making and, for Indigenous Peoples, their right to free, prior, and informed consent for projects that may impact their territories, livelihoods, and culture, and recognize the intersecting factors that increase the risk of threats and harassment for some defenders.

Recognized as identities, invisible as defenders

Recent research by the World Resources Institute found that Indigenous Peoples, women, local communities and youth are increasingly acknowledged as agents of change with decision-making capacity rather than as passive victims, but that only 5% of the literature explicitly identifies members of these groups as defenders working to protect ecosystems and resources.¹⁴ Climate governance therefore tends to recognise who these actors are without recognising what they do – monitoring deforestation, documenting violations, challenging extractive projects – or the risks they face as a result. Recognition of identity alone does not translate into protection or funding for their stewardship and advocacy.¹⁵

The research sets out what recognition would make possible: a practice-based definition of EHRDs in national and multilateral policymaking; the development of indicators to track their contributions to climate action; the establishment of protection mechanism combining physical safety measures, such as early-warning and rapid response systems and defender protection requirements in climate funding, with access to legal aid and judicial remedies; and the explicit naming of EHRDs, their roles and their protection and funding needs in NDCs, long-term low-emission development strategies and climate finance policies.¹⁶ Evidence that forests managed by Indigenous Peoples and local communities show lower deforestation rates and greater carbon sequestration than those under other regimes makes their contribution a measurable climate outcome rather than a matter of goodwill.¹⁷

Land and environmental defenders as essential actors in climate and biodiversity multilateral processes

Governments, UN agencies, and international negotiators should formally recognize land and environmental defenders as essential actors in achieving global climate and biodiversity goals and ensure their meaningful, safe, and effective participation in international environmental decision-making processes.

10. Amnesty International, [Protecting our Future: Environmental Human Rights Defenders Powering Just Transitions](#), 5 October 2026.

11. Amnesty International, [“Fossil Fuel Infrastructure is Putting Rights of 2 Billion People and Critical Ecosystems at Risk”](#), 12 November 2025.

12. See Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT), [Human rights principles and defenders’ role in just transition pathways](#), November 2025.

13. In Türkiye, host of COP31, local communities in Muğla province in south-western Türkiye have opposed coal mining for many years, with environmental defenders supporting them through legal interventions, campaigning and mobilization. Led by villagers, particularly women from İkizköy, their struggle has sought to protect the Akbelen Forest, a symbol of resistance to coal-mining expansion, and the region’s olive groves, both vital to local livelihoods. Villagers and defenders supporting them have faced criminal investigations and prosecutions for their peaceful environmental activism.

14. A. Martinez and E. Moses, [“Frontline Environmental Defenders Risk Their Lives, but Remain Overlooked in Climate Policies”](#), World Resources Institute, 23 April 2026.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.



With COP31 scheduled to take place in Türkiye, the host government and the UNFCCC should adopt proactive measures to guarantee the full participation, protection and inclusion of Indigenous and Afro-descendant people, campesino, and other local communities and EHRDs, including through safe access to accreditation processes, protection from reprisals, and dedicated spaces for dialogue with decision-makers.

Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that defenders from high-risk countries and conflict-affected regions can participate without fear of surveillance, intimidation, or retaliation before, during, or after these conferences.

The UNFCCC process should move beyond viewing defenders solely as victims of environmental conflict and instead recognize their essential role in delivering sustainable, long-term conservation, climate mitigation, and adaptation outcomes co-developed with communities.

Governments and funders should expand support for initiatives, such as the Leaders Network for Environmental Activists and Defenders (LEAD)¹⁸, and ensure policy coherence between UNFCCC and regional access rights agreements that include commitments for the recognition and protection of EHRDs, such as the Aarhus Convention in the UNECE region and the Escazú Agreement in Latin America and the Caribbean, and other mechanisms that strengthen protection, participation and access to resources for defenders.

Climate finance and nature-positive investment frameworks should include dedicated funding for EHRD protection, collective territorial governance and community-led conservation.

Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement will depend not only on stronger environmental commitments, but also on ensuring that the people protecting ecosystems on the ground can exercise their rights safely and free from violence.

Where the UNFCCC stands

The first Global Stocktake concluded without references to land and environmental defenders, a gap our COP28 briefing warned would undermine recognition of their role in addressing the climate crisis and disregard the increasing risks they face.¹⁹

COP30 in Belém delivered some first steps. In the Gender Action Plan negotiations, civil society secured the first-ever reference to environmental defenders in a UN climate text.²⁰ The Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034) explicitly references women environmental defenders for the first time, alongside women and girls of African descent, migrant women, women smallholder farmers, women from rural and remote communities and women with disabilities, and tasks Parties and relevant organisations with developing guidelines to enable the safe participation, protection and support of women environmental defenders at meetings and events at all levels.²¹ The Just Transition Work Programme decision contains the strongest rights-based operational framing ever adopted in a COP decision on just transition, including the individual and collective rights of Indigenous Peoples, self-determination and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC).²²

However, these gains are not yet reflected across negotiating streams where decisions are made on how climate action is designed, measured, financed and implemented. COP31 is the moment to carry them into implementing the Gender Action Plan, the second Global Stocktake, Action for Climate Empowerment, the Just Transition Mechanism, adaptation, and the rules governing access and participation in the COP process.

1. Access and the right to participation

COP31 in Antalya

COP31 will be held in Antalya, Türkiye, from 9 to 20 November 2026.²³ Under the Türkiye–Australia Partnership Modalities, Türkiye nominates a representative as COP31 President, while Australia appoints a “President

18. The [Leaders Network for Environmental Activists and Defenders \(LEAD\)](#) is a multistakeholder initiative that promotes multistakeholder dialogue to secure the recognition of defenders, strengthen their meaningful participation in multilateral decision-making spaces, increase their protection and reduce violence against them.

19. [Joint NGO briefing for UNFCCC COP28 on Land and Environmental Defenders](#), 28 November 2023.

20. FIDH, [“COP30 delivers a crucial step forward on human rights and just transition, but a heads-on roadmap for a fossil fuel phaseout remains a mirage”](#), 24 November 2025.

21. UNFCCC, [“The Belém Gender Action Plan: A launchpad accelerating ambitious, effective, and inclusive climate action”](#), 12 December 2025; African Climate Wire, [“COP30’s Gender Action Plan Needed to Address Climate-Induced Violence”](#), 12 December 2025.

22. IISD, [“Just Transition Work Programme at COP 30: New mechanism hailed as a win – But when will it deliver?”](#), 27 November 2025.

23. UNFCCC, [“The Road to Antalya”](#).



of Negotiations” with exclusive authority over the negotiations. Türkiye entered into the Host Country Agreement with the UNFCCC, to fulfil the host country’s operational and logistical responsibilities, and lead the COP31 Action Agenda.²⁴

The Host Country Agreement (HCA) included a clause that states that participants will have a duty to not interfere with Türkiye’s internal affairs, a broad wording that could create a chilling effect on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and public protest.²⁵ Civic space in the host country is also a serious concern, with the CIVICUS Monitor rating Türkiye’s civic space as “repressed” since 2018.²⁶ Türkiye has been found repeatedly to have violated the rights of human rights defenders, including by the European Court of Human Rights.²⁷

Journalists reporting critically about matters of public concern are targeted in abusive criminal investigations and prosecutions and are subjected to arbitrary use of punitive pretrial detention under overly broad and vague criminal code provisions such as the “disinformation law”.²⁸ Protests critical of the authorities are routinely banned and peaceful protesters subjected to excessive use of police force and arbitrary detention. Civil society organizations face punitive and burdensome audits and even closure for their legitimate activities.²⁹

Most recently, in September 2026, the Turkish authorities launched a wave of raids and arbitrary detentions targeting LGBTQI+ human rights defenders and their organizations.³⁰

What is being negotiated

Observer access and engagement are handled under the SBI agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings. A process to strengthen observer engagement in the UNFCCC, which began in 2022, has been developed with observer constituency focal points and through focus groups of stakeholder representatives, with changes to the secretariat’s administrative measures reported to Parties in a biennial report on observer engagement.³¹ The mandated biennial report for 2024–2025 on progress in implementing previous SBI conclusions on enhancing observer engagement was prepared ahead of the SB64 negotiations on this item, and the secretariat has been briefing the incoming COP31 Presidency on observer engagement modalities.³²

Recent sessions have discussed how to enhance observer engagement, particularly from underrepresented regions, including possible changes to the speaking order so that civil society representatives are not addressing empty rooms, and rules on civil society messaging on UN premises; the recently recognized disability caucus is continuing to advocate for formal recognition as a UNFCCC constituency³³ while Afro-descendants are also pressing for recognition and enhanced participation.³⁴ Access is also constrained in practice: for SB64, demand from IGOs and NGOs far exceeded quotas, with over 12,000 nominations received for 2,000 available slots, and 570 side event applications competed for 130 slots.³⁵

That scarcity does not fall evenly. Quota systems that look equal on paper can still produce unequal outcomes in practice if the organizations best resourced to navigate nomination processes and the costs of participation are concentrated in the same regions that already face fewer structural barriers to participation. At the same time, industry access remains extensive. Analysis by the Kick Big Polluters Out coalition found that more than 1,600 fossil fuel lobbyists were granted access to COP30, one in every 25 participants, more than any country delegation other than host Brazil. COP30 was the first COP at which all non-government participants were expected to publicly disclose who funded their participation and to confirm alignment with UNFCCC objectives, a requirement that did not apply to Party delegations.³⁶

24. [Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities](#), 21 November 2025.

25. The Climate Watch, [Türkiye’s COP31 hosting terms raise free speech concerns among climate activists](#).

26. Norwegian Helsinki Committee, [“Shrinking, dominated civic space in Türkiye leading up to local elections”](#), 26 March 2024.

27. Amnesty International, [“Türkiye: Osman Kavala must be immediately released following European Court order to quash his conviction”](#), 26 August 2026.

28. Amnesty International, [“Türkiye: End the crackdown on journalists”](#) (Index:to disclose who funded their participation publicly EUR 44/0957/2026), 3 May 2026

29. Amnesty International, [“Türkiye: Absurd charges against board of LGBTQI+ organization must be dropped”](#), 7 April 2026.

30. Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT), [“Turkey: Mass arbitrary detention of LGBTQI+ human rights defenders”](#), 23 September 2026.

31. UNFCCC, [“Process to strengthen observer engagement i n the UNFCCC process”](#) (concept note).

32. UNFCCC, [“UN Climate Change Quarterly Update: Q1 2026”](#).

33. CBM UK, [“Historic climate action win: Disability Caucus secures official recognition”](#), 27 February 2026.

34. Joint open letter, [“Afro-Descendant peoples must be recognized as a formal constituency within the UNFCCC”](#), November 2025.

35. UNFCCC, [Message to Parties and observers](#), Q1 2026 update, 22 May 2026; UNFCCC Quarterly Update Q1 2026 (see note 31).

36. Global Witness, [“Over 1,600 fossil fuel lobbyists attended COP30, says KBPO”](#), 14 November 2025, ; Kick Big Polluters Out, [“Fossil fuel lobbyists flood COP30 climate talks in Brazil, with largest ever attendance share”](#).



Why it matters for defenders

Defenders have repeatedly raised concerns about access, participation, and freedom of assembly at UNFCCC meetings, including visa restrictions, costs, quotas, exclusion from negotiating rooms, and the risk of surveillance and reprisals upon return home. In an example embodying the risk for participating in COPs, Daria Egereva – Chair of the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change – was arbitrarily detained by Russian authorities under unfounded terrorism charges shortly after her return from COP30.³⁷ Access is not a logistical detail: it determines whose evidence reaches negotiators, and whether the communities most affected by climate action and climate impacts can hold Parties to account. It also determines whose evidence counts as evidence in the first place. Community-based documentation and testimony carry the same weight as technical or governmental submissions in principle, but rarely in practice, and that gap shapes every other part of this section.

Given the civic space concerns in the host country set out above, COP31 requires explicit and public guarantees. Reprisals on return home increasingly follow participants online as much as they do offline, through coordinated harassment, disinformation and doxxing campaigns that pick up where in-person surveillance leaves off.

Recommendations

The COP31 Co-Presidency (Türkiye and Australia) should:

- Demonstrate commitment to fulfilling human rights obligations by protecting civic space, ending reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society representatives, and ensuring that participants and human rights defenders can exercise their rights without fear of intimidation, reprisals or gender-based violence before, during and after COP31.
- Guarantee that human rights defenders can freely express themselves and peacefully assemble inside and outside the COP Venue, as guaranteed by international standards related to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.
- Keep negotiations open to observers wherever permitted and ensure accessible accreditation and timely and equitable visa processes for human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, particularly from high-risk countries.

The UNFCCC Secretariat should:

- Adopt a zero-tolerance policy on intimidation, harassment and reprisals against observers, and designate a focal point to receive, monitor and follow up on reports of reprisals linked to participation in UNFCCC processes.
- Develop and publish, well in advance of COPs, host country agreements with clear human rights principles and criteria, including guarantees for freedom of peaceful assembly, association and expression, as protected under international law.

Parties should:

- Recognize the link between the climate crisis and growing violence, criminalization and repression against land and environmental defenders, and take meaningful steps to protect environmental human rights defenders and civic space online and offline.
- Carry the rights-based language agreed in Belém into all COP31 decisions, including references to environmental human rights defenders, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the rights of Indigenous Peoples including FPIC.

The COP31 Co-Presidency, the UNFCCC Secretariat and Parties should:

- Ensure transparency in badge allocation and quotas, regional balance in accreditation, and prioritized speaking slots for Indigenous Peoples, local communities and environmental human rights defenders.
- Keep negotiating rooms, including informal consultations, open to observers wherever permitted.

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37. See the [timeline by the Free Daria Egereva campaign](#).



- Remove practical barriers to participation, including timely and predictable visa processing; financial support for participation from underrepresented regions and high-risk countries; and reliable hybrid participation options for those who cannot travel safely, built around the connectivity and digital literacy levels participants in different regions of the world actually have.
- Implement a special digital visa system for all accredited participants to all UNFCCC meetings, guaranteed to be available within one week of application.
- Advance an accountability framework on conflicts of interest, extending disclosure of affiliation and funding requirements to all participants, including Party delegations, and limiting the influence of those whose business models drive the harms defenders resist.
- Establish a regular, formal space for dialogue between Parties, the Presidencies and environmental human rights defenders, building on the recommendation in our COP28 briefing for a dedicated dialogue on defenders under the UNFCCC.

2. Implementation of the Gender Action Plan (GAP)

What is being negotiated

At COP30, Parties adopted the Belém Gender Action Plan (decision 7/CP.30), a nine-year plan for 2026–2034 implementing the vision of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender. It contains 27 activities and 98 deliverables, with regular reporting and a mid-term review in 2029, and calls on governments, UN entities, civil society and other relevant organisations to drive implementation from the global to the local level.³⁸ The mid-term review will be conducted jointly with the enhanced Lima work programme on gender, beginning at SBI70 (June 2029) and concluding at SBI71 (November 2029), with a decision expected at COP34.³⁹

The plan places strong emphasis on “multidimensional factors” and, for the first time in this framework, explicitly references women environmental defenders, alongside women and girls of African descent, migrant women, women smallholder farmers, women from rural and remote communities and women with disabilities.⁴⁰ It also tasks Parties and relevant organisations, from grassroots groups to UN agencies, with delivering workshops on barriers to women’s leadership and developing guidelines to enable the safe participation, protection and support of women environmental human rights defenders (WEHRDs) at meetings and events at all levels.⁴¹

SB64 in June 2026 effectively launched the implementation phase, with mandated dialogues on gender-responsive climate finance, gender and age-disaggregated data and the strengthening of the role of national gender and climate change focal points.⁴² Civil society observers reported that the first annual dialogue with the multilateral climate funds on gender-responsive climate finance, a key GAP deliverable, saw funds largely restate existing programming, and that Bonn did not deliver the financial ambition needed for implementation.⁴³ COP30 guidance to the Green Climate Fund links the Fund to the Belém GAP, with a new GCF gender action plan expected in 2026.⁴⁴ Momentum across key deliverables is maintained, particularly regarding further building the evidence base of gender and climate change through national assessments and the deliverables regarding women environmental defenders.

Why it matters for defenders

The Belém GAP is the first recognition of EHRDs in this part of the UNFCCC framework, and it turns that recognition into deliverables, including guidelines to protect women environmental defenders. This makes its implementation the most concrete existing mandate through which the UNFCCC can act to protect defenders. The need is documented: of the 124 defenders killed in 2025, 14 were women and one was non-binary,

38. UNFCCC, “[The Belém Gender Action Plan: A launchpad accelerating ambitious, effective, and inclusive climate action](#)”, 12 December 2025.

39. UN Women, “[Latin America and the Caribbean implement the Belém Action Plan on Gender](#)”, December 2025.

40. UNFCCC, 12 December 2025 (see note above)programorganizationsorganizations.

41. African Climate Wire, “[COP30’s Gender Action Plan Needed to Address Climate-Induced Violence](#)”, 12 December 2025.

42. FEMNET, “[Why the Gender Action Plan Matters More Than Ever](#)”, 2 July 2026.

43. Women and Gender Constituency, “[SB64 Outcome Statement: Feminists are Fighting, but Delay and Distraction are Marking this Process](#)”, June 2026; FEMNET (see note above).

44. Women and Gender Constituency, “[COP30 Outcome Statement: Feminist Power Delivered – But the Process Failed to Meet the Moment](#)”, 24 November 2025.



and the Mesoamerican Initiative of Women Human Rights Defenders has documented more than 30,000 non-lethal attacks on women in Mexico and Central America between 2012 and 2023, including harassment, smear campaigns, threats, surveillance and psychological violence.⁴⁵ Without adequate socialization and awareness, dedicated finance and clear accountability, these deliverables risk remaining on paper.

Recommendations

Parties, the UNFCCC Secretariat and relevant organizations should:

- Ensure that women environmental defenders, including Indigenous, Afro-descendant, campesina and rural women defenders, are directly involved in designing the protection and participation guidelines and the workshops on barriers to women's leadership, and that their organisations are resourced to take part.
- Ensure gender-responsive climate finance commitments translate into accessible, direct and grant-based funding for women-led and community-led organizations, including through the Green Climate Fund's Gender Action Plan.
- Raise awareness and strengthen the role of national gender and climate change focal points in engaging women defenders and documenting the barriers and risks they face, and reflect this in national reporting.
- Ensure coherence between GAP implementation and other tracks addressed in this briefing, so that the recognition of women environmental defenders in the GAP is mirrored in the Just Transition Action Mechanism, ACE, adaptation and the Global Stocktake.

3. Global Stocktake

What is being negotiated

The second Global Stocktake (GST2) will commence at CMA8 (November 2026, in Antalya) and conclude at CMA10 (November 2028), covering the period 2024–2028. Its outcome will inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support, as well as international cooperation for climate action. GST2 comprises three components: information collection and preparation; technical assessment, which will commence at the 66th Subsidiary Body sessions in June 2027; and consideration of outputs.⁴⁶

The SB Chairs have issued guiding questions for the information collection and preparation component and a call for submissions, open to inputs as soon as possible and no later than 28 February 2027.⁴⁷ The procedural and logistical elements of future stocktakes were refined through decision 3/CMA.7, and the first UAE Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake convened in conjunction with SB64 in June 2026.⁴⁸

Why it matters for defenders

As our joint COP28 briefing highlighted, the lack of references to defenders in the first Global Stocktake undermined recognition of their role in addressing the climate crisis and disregarded the increasing risks they face.⁴⁹ GST2 is the main opportunity in this cycle to assess collectively whether climate action is being delivered in a way that respects human rights – and to feed that assessment into the next round of NDCs. The launch of GST2 at COP31 will set the tone for what information is gathered and whose voices are heard.

Recommendations

Parties, the SB Chairs and the UNFCCC Secretariat should:

- Ensure that the information collection phase of GST2 explicitly gathers evidence on how climate action, including NDCs, adaptation plans and transition projects, has respected, protected and fulfilled human rights, including the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and environmental human rights defenders.

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45. Global Witness, [Collective power: The struggle for protection for land and environmental defenders](#), 16 September 2026.

46. UNFCCC, ["The second global stocktake"](#).

47. Ibid.

48. UNFCCC, ["Follow-up to the first global stocktake"](#).

49. [Joint NGO briefing for UNFCCC COP28 on Land and Environmental Defenders](#), 28 November 2023.



- Actively invite and facilitate inputs from defenders' networks, Indigenous Peoples' organisations, civil society documenting attacks, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant UN Special Procedures, and ensure these are reflected in synthesis reports.
- Guarantee safe, accessible and meaningful participation of defenders in GST2 technical dialogues, including hybrid participation options and protection from reprisals.
- Ensure that the GST2 outcome provides specific guidance on how Parties should integrate the protection of defenders, civic space, public participation and access to information into their next NDCs, and report on actions taken.

4. Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

What is being negotiated

ACE covers six elements under the Convention and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement: education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation. It is taken forward through the Glasgow work programme on ACE, adopted at COP26 for 2021–2031, and its action plan.⁵⁰

At COP30, Parties decided that the 2026 ACE Dialogue, held at SBI64 in June 2026, should facilitate inputs to inform the midterm review of the Glasgow work programme.⁵¹ At SBI64 the midterm review was initiated but not concluded: the SBI agreed to continue consideration at SBI65 in November 2026, alongside COP31, on the basis of the co-facilitators' informal note. Parties, observers and other stakeholders were invited to submit views by 1 October 2026, including proposals for strengthening existing activities and new elements, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of a new action plan under the Glasgow work programme.⁵²

Why it matters for defenders

Two of the six ACE elements, public participation and public access to information, are procedural rights defenders exercise and that are most often denied to them. Denial of access is only part of the picture. Consultation and FPIC processes tied to mining, geothermal, and carbon-market projects across Southeast Asia and Latin America exist on paper.⁵³ Still, on-the-ground evidence shows they routinely carry no weight in the decisions they are meant to inform. Climate mis- and disinformation, often spread by fossil fuel companies with the aid of Big Tech companies, also harm public access to information relating to climate change.

ACE is therefore the most direct entry point in the UNFCCC for commitments on civic space, and the midterm review and the design of a new action plan at COP31 are an opportunity to make those elements meaningful rather than rhetorical. As a largely voluntary workstream, ACE will only deliver if the new action plan sets out concrete activities and if implementation is resourced.

Recommendations

Parties should:

- Ensure that activities under the elements of public participation and access to information explicitly address the enabling environment for civil society (including on countering climate mis- and disinformation) and the protection of environmental human rights defenders, including women defenders and Indigenous and Afro-descendant defenders.
- Recognize environmental human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and civil society organizations as implementers of ACE, and provide dedicated, accessible funding for their participation and their education, training and awareness-raising work.
- Invite Parties to report, through their ACE national focal points and national communications, on barriers to participation and access to information that environmental human rights defenders face, including attacks, criminalization and reprisals, and also steps taken towards the recognition of their role as climate actors and their protection.

50. UNFCCC, "Action for Climate Empowerment".

51. UNFCCC, [Draft text on SBI 63 agenda item 19, Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment](#).

52. UNFCCC, "Action for Climate Empowerment".

53. Lara, I. (2026). ["When governance produces violence How environmental defenders build protection from the ground up"](#). Reclaiming the South series of paper. Asuntos del Sur.



- Mandate an interactive workshop, as part of the ACE Dialogues, to enable the sharing of experience and resources on facilitating inclusive participation for all members of society, with a specific focus on environmental human rights defenders in developing and implementing ACE activities at all levels, International, regional, and national.
- Strengthen coherence between ACE and other tracks, including the Belém Gender Action Plan activities on women environmental defenders, the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, and national implementation of regional agreements on access rights such as the Escazú Agreement and Aarhus Convention.
- Ensure that the design and implementation of the new action plan is informed by the submissions of defenders' networks and that its implementation is monitored with disaggregated information on who is being reached.

5. Just Transition and BAM negotiations

What is being negotiated

The COP30 decision under the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was the strongest operational human rights language so far secured in a COP text.⁵⁴ It emphasized respecting, promoting, and fulfilling human rights and labor rights through whole-of-society, whole-of-economy, and multisectoral approaches; the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment; and the individual and collective rights of Indigenous Peoples, including self-determination and FPIC. It also recognized the rights and needs of people of African descent, local communities, migrants, informal workers, women and people in vulnerable situations. It underscored the need for broad, inclusive participation. Earlier drafts had included references to the social and environmental risks of scaling up supply chains for critical minerals, but these were removed from the final text.⁵⁵

At COP30, Parties further agreed to develop a just transition mechanism “to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing, and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions”, and requested the Subsidiary Bodies to recommend a draft decision on the process for its operationalization for adoption at COP31.⁵⁶ Civil society observers now commonly refer to it as the Belém–Antalya Mechanism (BAM).⁵⁷ The full set of above-mentioned guiding principles for a just transition must be considered a permanent set of human rights safeguards and priorities for the BAM and transition pathways at large. They must be translated into the BAM’s structure, functions, modalities, and activities to ensure rights, and the protection and participation of their defenders, remain a core priority and benchmark.

At SB64, the co-chairs tabled an informal note organizing Parties’ proposals into clusters – context, purpose, functions, modalities and governance, timelines, and links to the JTWP – which will be an input to SB65, collecting a wide range of views, rather than a negotiating text. There was broader convergence on functions such as knowledge-sharing, technical assistance, capacity-building and support for integrating just transition into NDCs, NAPs and long-term strategies, and several developing country groups floated a phased build-out from design in 2026 to scaled implementation by 2028–2030.⁵⁸

In parallel, Parties agreed upon the terms of reference for reviewing the JTWP’s effectiveness and efficiency. The review will take place at COP31 within the SB65 discussions, ahead of a decision on the program’s continuation at COP31. The terms of reference ask the review to consider how it could “inform or be informed by” the operationalization of the Just Transition Mechanism.⁵⁹

Why it matters for defenders

The BAM must support transition pathways that comply with human rights and contribute to the 1.5-degree-or-below temperature limit as an obligation under international law, as outlined by the International Court of Justice in its climate advisory opinion. False solutions that do not address the main emission drivers or

54. FIDH, “COP30 delivers a crucial step forward on human rights and just transition, but a heads-on roadmap for a fossil fuel phaseout remains a mirage”, 24 November 2026.

55. IISD, “Just Transition Work Programme at COP 30: New mechanism hailed as a win – But when will it deliver?”, 27 November 2025.

56. IISD, 27 November 2025 (see note above).

57. IISD, “Just Transition Work Programme in 2026: Just transition mechanism starts taking shape, details left for COP 31”, 6 July 2026.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.



human rights concerns will perpetuate dependence on climate-breaking resources as well as injustices for marginalized and unconsulted communities and their defenders.⁶⁰

Furthermore, mining was the deadliest sector for defenders in 2025, and Indigenous leaders warn that projects presented as solutions – renewable energy and transition minerals – without adequate human rights safeguards are driving land grabs, dispossession and violence.⁶¹ The latest research also shows a 73% year-on-year increase in human rights abuse allegations against the sector’s leading transition mineral mining operations around the world.⁶²

The decisions taken in Antalya on the mechanism’s purpose, governance and functions will determine whether the human rights language agreed in Belém becomes operational. A mechanism that supports transition projects without participation, safeguards and accountability risks financing and legitimizing projects that generate conflict with communities and defenders. Moreover, such a BAM structure must align with international human rights and environmental law obligations on the right to public participation, as well as commitments under Article 4 of the UNFCCC and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement.

To prevent further violations and abuses, and to avoid repeating “business as usual” through transition policies, the BAM must guarantee full, institutionalized representation and participation for UNFCCC rightsholder constituencies, civil society, and EHRDs. Permanent and meaningful inclusion must extend across all decision-making and knowledge-creation processes to ensure transition pathways grounded in human rights and the local experiences of defenders and their communities.

Recommendations

Parties should ensure that the BAM’s operationalization:

- Anchors the Mechanism’s purpose, functioning and guiding principles in the full list of human rights safeguards agreed in Paragraph 12 of Decision 2/CMA.7, with the BAM set up as a constituted body under the UNFCCC to ensure just transition principles thoroughly inform the CMA and COP’s other work strands.
- Provides for governance, institutional and knowledge-creation processes that centre meaningful and formal roles for environmental human rights defenders, and rights-holder constituencies, including workers, children, young people, feminist and gender advocates, Indigenous Peoples, and civil society more broadly, as well as groups in situations of marginalization and local communities.
- Guarantees its accessibility and non-discrimination, including child, disability, and gender responsiveness, in accordance with international human rights norms and principles.
- Ensures social dialogue with the full and meaningful inclusion of labour rights defenders working on a just transition, regardless of their employment status, and trade unions, in alignment with the ILO Guidelines on the matter.
- Explicitly respects and promotes the rights and ancestral knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and environmental human rights defenders, including through the application of FPIC as well as precautionary and no-contact principles, and advances protective measures such as no-go approaches that prevent top-down harmful activities in Indigenous territories.
- Includes functions to provide technical assistance, guidance, capacity-building on human rights norms and standards – including on the rights of specific groups at risk of marginalisation and high-risk sectors –, human rights due diligence, public participation and community-led collective protection and transition pathways.
- Establishes safeguards, accountability and an accessible grievance mechanism, together with a clear policy against reprisals for those who engage with the mechanism or raise concerns about projects it supports.
- Ensure that the JTWP review assesses the participation of environmental human rights defenders, civil society from all rightsholder groups, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and addresses barriers to their safe engagement, including through the BAM’s knowledge-creation function.

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60. FIDH, [“Road to COP31: The new Just Transition Mechanism must live up to its name and guarantee real participation”](#) (2026).

61. Global Witness, Collective power.

62. Business & Human Rights Centre, [“Transition Minerals Tracker: 2026 global analysis”](#).



6. Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

What is being negotiated

At COP30, Parties adopted 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators to track progress towards the GGA, concluding the United Arab Emirates–Belém work program. The indicators cover the targets of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and were adopted with language stressing that they are voluntary, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative and country-driven, should not create additional reporting burdens and should not be linked to access to finance.⁶³ Parties are invited to disaggregate indicators according to their circumstances and contexts, including by social categories.⁶⁴

The same decision launched the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation (BAVA), a two-year, Party-led policy alignment process to develop guidance on operationalising, refining and applying the indicators, supported by a technical taskforce working on metadata and methodologies, for consideration at CMA9 in November 2027. A review of the UAE Framework and the indicators is to take place in 2029, after the second Global Stocktake.⁶⁵

At SB64 in June 2026, negotiations stalled on the final day over the composition and modalities of the technical task force and over whether and how to reference the tripling of adaptation finance. Parties could not agree to carry forward draft text and the negotiations ended under Rule 16, so discussions will restart at COP31.⁶⁶

The Baku Adaptation Roadmap also remains a key area of political debate, including over its scope and how it should contribute to coherence across the adaptation architecture. Divergent views within the G77 have emerged on the future of the Belém–Addis Vision, although tripling adaptation finance remains a central demand in the negotiations, particularly among developing countries.

During the September 2026 climate week in Baku, Australia indicated that it would seek to ensure that COP31 does not conclude without agreement on the Belém–Addis Vision and proposed to convene online discussions among Parties to explore areas of convergence. Whether this can help bridge the significant differences over the scope and content of the Vision will be an important issue to watch ahead of COP31.

Why it matters for defenders

What is measured shapes what is done. If the indicators and guidance developed under the Belém–Addis Vision capture only physical and sectoral outputs, the governance conditions that determine whether adaptation is effective and rights-respecting, secure tenure, participation, access to information and justice, and the safety of those who speak up, including EHRDs, will remain invisible. The composition of the technical taskforce, and whether Indigenous Peoples and local communities take part in developing metadata and methodologies, will determine whether their knowledge systems are recognized.

Recommendations

Parties should, in the COP31 decision on the Global Goal on Adaptation:

- Agree the composition and working modalities of the technical task force so that it provides for the meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, children, youth, women and knowledge holders, including through the rights-based constituencies and bodies such as the Indigenous Peoples Caucus, the Disability Caucus and the Women and Gender Constituency as well as the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, alongside technical experts.
- Ensure that guidance developed under the Belém–Addis Vision addresses governance and enabling conditions, including public participation, access to information and justice, FPIC, land and tenure security and the safety of communities and defenders engaged in adaptation.
- Encourage disaggregation of indicator data by social groups, including Indigenous Peoples, people of African descent, small-scale farmers, women and youth, so that adaptation progress can be assessed for those most exposed.

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63. CGIAR, “Making Adaptation Measurable: CGIAR, the Global Goal on Adaptation, and the COP30 Outcome”; UNFCCC, [draft decision FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.25](#).

64. IOM Environmental Migration Portal, “[Indicators Defined at COP30 to Track Adapting to Climate Change: Progress under the Global Goal on Adaptation Include Climate Mobility](#)”, said

65. C2ES, “[Next Steps for the Belém Adaptation Indicators](#)”, March 2026.

66. C2ES, “[What happened to the Global Goal on Adaptation at SB64? Where do we go from here?](#)”, 27 July 2026; IISD, “[Stalemate on the Global Goal on Adaptation in Bonn: What does this mean for countries?](#)”, 30 June 2026.



- Resolve the means of implementation and the tripling of adaptation finance, ensuring support reaches the community level and that indicators are not used to condition access to finance.
- Ensure the 2029 review of the UAE Framework and the indicators draws on evidence from affected communities and environmental human rights defenders, not only from national reporting systems.
- Ensure that the Belém–Addis Vision and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap reinforce, rather than fragment, the adaptation architecture, with clear mandates, links to constituted bodies and work programmes, and meaningful participation of developing countries, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and rights-based constituencies.
- Build convergence around on the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, Belém–Addis Vision, and the technical taskforce.
- Ensure that the Belém–Addis Vision develops sufficiently robust and comparable guidance, metadata and methodologies to make the indicators meaningful for tracking adaptation progress, while respecting the voluntary, country-driven nature of the framework and avoiding additional reporting burdens.
- Ensure that related adaptation items at COP31 – assessment of progress on National Adaptation Plans, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the Global Implementation Accelerator – examine whether adaptation planning has been participatory and whether FPIC and tenure rights were respected, and include civil society, Indigenous Peoples and local communities in their delivery.



See below the list of organizations endorsing these recommendations for advancing climate justice through increased participation, recognition, and protection of Environmental Human Rights Defenders:

- Acción Ecológica
- Aid Life Learn Environment
- Al-Marsad – Arab Human Rights Center in Golan Heights
- Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial Brussels
- Asociación Ciudadana por los Derechos Humanos
- Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España (APDHE)
- Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH)
- Associação Justiça nos Trilhos
- Association for Farmers Rights Defense (AFRD)
- Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)
- Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (ATPDH)
- Association Tunisienne de Défense des Libertés Individuelles (ADLI)
- Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD)
- Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law (BHR)
- Center for Prisoners' Rights
- Center for Spatial Justice – Mekanda Adalet Derneği (MAD)
- Centre for Citizens Conserving Environment & Management (CECIC)



- Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)
- Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS)
- Civil Society Institute - Armenia
- Climate Action Network Australia (CANA)
- Climate Defenders Australia
- Climate Rights International
- Club de Madrid
- Coalition des Volontaires pour la Paix et le Développement (CVPD-RDC)
- Collectif de Sauvegarde de la Ligue algérienne des droits de l'Homme (CS-LADDH)
- Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos (CEDHU)
- Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras (COFADEH)
- Den norske Helsingforskomité
- Dibeem for Environmental Development
- Disability Peoples' Forum Uganda
- Ecoseres
- Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)
- Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)
- Global Participe
- Greenpeace International
- Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR)
- Habitat Defenders Africa
- Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
- Indigenous Peoples Rights International (IPRI)
- Instituto de Abogados para la Protección del Medio Ambiente (INSAPROMA)
- Integrated Disabled Women Activities (IDIWA)
- International Accountability Project (IAP)
- Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR)
- Laudato Si' Movement
- League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI)
- Les Mêmes Droits pour Tous
- Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos
- Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens
- Ligue des Droits et Libertés
- Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos (MNDH Brasil)
- National Fisheries Solidarity Movement (NAFSO)
- Network of Associations for the Protection of Environment and Nature (RAPEN)



- Oil Refinery Residents Association (ORRA)
- Organisation Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (ONDH)
- Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH)
- Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO)
- Pilex Centre for Civic Education Initiative
- Porgera Red Wara (River) Women's Association Incorporated (PRWWA INC.)
- Program for the Heritage of Ogiek and Mother Earth (PROHOME)
- Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (PROVEA)
- Public Association "Dignity"
- Public Interest Law Center (PILC)
- Red Ecofeminista de Latinoamérica y el Caribe
- Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO)
- Réseau des Défenseurs des Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale (REDHAC)
- Resilient40
- Sindicato de Trabajadores Ambientales de Argentina (AGOEC)
- Solidarité pour l'Encadrement et la Lutte contre la Pauvreté (SELP)
- Sustainable Strategic Solutions
- Swedwatch
- Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM)
- The People's Coalition for Fisheries Justice – Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan (KIARA)
- Tipping Point North South
- Union for Civil Liberty (UCL)
- World's Youth for Climate Justice (WYCJ)
- Youth and Environment Europe (YEE)
- Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights)