Guide on digitally-mediated assemblies and how to monitor them

How to use this Guide

 

The purpose of this Guide is to offer insights on how you can:

• Collect data on the new ways digital technologies are used to organise assemblies and protests;
• Uncover any opportunities and challenges that digital technologies present;
• Learn about your rights and freedoms when it comes to digitally-mediated assemblies;
• Explore if and how governmental and private actors enable, facilitate, and protect such assemblies and protests.

Find out more by scrolling down or using the Table of Contents on the right side to directly navigate to the specific section you are most interested in.

This Guide is work in progress and we are interested to keep expanding it together with you! We invite you to reach out to us at [email protected] to:

• Give feedback to any of the chapters or questions;
• Suggest additional resources or literature;
• Share experiences on other useful methods to monitor digitally-mediated assemblies you have encountered;
• Tell us if you are interested to pilot this methodology with us, we are ready and eager to work together! 

 

Introduction

 

The right of peaceful assembly is essential to democracy and a central means for people collectively to express their views and needs; to associate or otherwise affirm group identity or solidarity; to contribute to social, cultural, and political discourse; and to hold authorities to account. Moreover, monitoring the right of peaceful assembly has never been more important, as recent protests worldwide have been met with various state restrictions and repressive practices, such as surveillance and limitations on gatherings imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Traditionally, the definition of peaceful assembly was limited physical gatherings of more than one individual to protest, commemorate, exchange views, or take part in social, religious, commercial, and/or recreational activities. Today, however, our increasingly digital world has opened up not only new ways to organise assemblies but also even new virtual spaces in which to hold them.

In 2016, for example, after members of the Egyptian satirical group Street Children were arrested because of their YouTube and Facebook videos mocking the government, a social media campaign emerged in which other Egyptians protested the arrests by posting selfies with the caption “Does a mobile phone camera shake you?” and the simple but unifying hashtag #FreedomForStreetChildren.

That same year, in Zimbabwe, a pastor posted a video to his social media accounts using the hashtag #thisflag and an image of the Zimbabwean flag to protest certain government actions. The video was shared thousands of times, and other citizens made videos or posts of their own to express their similar views, linking them to the original post using the hashtag. As a group of scholars observed: “The synchronicity of this response was comparable to a spontaneous assembly.” That was a good way of putting it, even if it is also true, more generally, that the concept of synchronicity can be diluted by the online nature of a gathering that might have peaks and valleys in its level of participation over time.

Meanwhile, protestors in Spain organised and held the first holographic assembly there, after the government tried to prohibit public meetings without prior notice. People made videos of themselves that were converted into holograms and displayed outside several government buildings and shared widely on social media. Roughly a year later, the #MeToo movement provided a powerful example of “transnational digital assemblies” in which the participants’ purposes and/or intentions varied over time and even departed occasionally from those of the movement’s organisers.

And more recently, of course, people have gathered online during the pandemic to express common sentiments and to protest many different issues. This has happened all over the world and in particular in Europe: in Hungary, in Moldova, in Poland, and beyond. Where physical protests have been suspended or unsafe to organise, they have frequently moved online.

So, it was timely that in July 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment No. 37 on Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the right of peaceful assembly. The General Comment is the first authoritative interpretation and comprehensive guidance on States’ obligations to facilitate and protect the right of peaceful assembly. It is a landmark document because for the first time, it unequivocally establishes that States’ obligations to facilitate and protect the right of peaceful assembly also apply to digitally-mediated assemblies, assemblies held in private spaces and assemblies that do not have a primarily expressive purpose. This means that not only assemblies held in publicly accessible spaces to protest or demonstrate deserve protection, but also, e.g., gatherings for commemoratives reasons or to play games or take part in other collective recreational activities, as well private meetings of more than two people held in enclosed spaces, either online or offline. At the same time, the different nature and characteristics of these assemblies means that they cannot be subject to the same type of restrictions. The General Comment further addresses the responsibilities of law enforcement, the use of firearms and less-lethal weapons, the rights of counter-demonstrators, as well as the protections for journalists and others covering or observing a protest. 

 

 

 

Digitally-mediated assemblies

 

A digitally-mediated assembly is a gathering of more than one person for specific purposes that takes place either through the support of, or by means of, digital communication technologies (e.g., mobile phones, Internet services, or social media). In other words, digitally-mediated assembly is the umbrella term that encompasses all types of assemblies with at least a digital component. We hereby offer a number of examples and cases to illustrate how these assemblies may look like in practice:

Digitally-enabled: taking place in physical spaces but facilitated by digital technologies (in particular by the Internet), because, e.g., they are previously discussed, organised and/or promoted through them. For example, protest organisers might use a Facebook page to invite people to an event in a public square and use Twitter to keep the news media informed.

Real-life cases:

• Slovenia: cycling protests and other innovative approaches to defend freedom and democracy organised/co-ordinated online and taking place offline.
• Poland: online and offline protests against Poland’s abortion law organised by Strajk Kobiet, a Polish women’s rights social movement campaigning against curbs to abortion access. A blend of online groups, messenger apps, live feeds and social media channels allowed quick and easy updates to details of protest – ensuring that, when demonstrations went ahead, protestors were kept safe and informed.
• Hong Kong: the case of the 2019 pro-democracy movement as an example of a modern, decentralized, ‘networked’ social movement embracing the leaderless claim and using social media to favour the loss of organisational structures and embrace participatory horizontality. However, they moved away from Facebook and Twitter and used new forms of communication and social media platforms – most notably, Telegram and LIHKG.
• Fridays for Future: mobilisations across Europe and beyond co-ordinated first online and then implemented offline. The climate change movement adapted relatively quickly to restrictions on gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic, with activists taking to 'digital striking' on social media and promoting hashtags like #ClimateStrikeOnline and #FightEveryCrisis.

Digitally-based: usually called “online assemblies”, as they take place in an entirely virtual space (usually the Internet, via websites, social media platforms but also video-games and in the so-called “metaverse” ). For example, protestors might post messages and/or selfie videos on Twitter, all with the same hashtag, to criticise a public official. Or activists might gather via Zoom to exchange ideas, or they might conduct a synchronised Denial of Service (DoS attack to slow down traffic to a particular website in order to make a political or social point, a practice that has come to be known as “hacktivism”).

Real-life cases:

• Spain: the first holographic assembly organised and held there by #NoSomosDelito, after the government tried to prohibit public meetings without prior notice. People made videos of themselves that were converted into holograms and displayed outside several government buildings and shared widely on social media.
• Hungary: online petitions (e.g. ahang.hu platform).
• Poland: self-organised democratic processes (e.g. public hearings by OFOP, Polish national federation of NGOs).
• Denmark: Activists used virtual reality to march in the Copenhagen Pride; from concerts to programme of lectures, exhibitions and an LGBTQIA+ hall of fame, in 2020 LGTBI members could explore the Copenhagen Pride through the virtual reality (similar approaches happened across the globe during June pride month in 2020).
• Netherlands: in February 2020, Dutch-based non-profit foundation Superflus staged what is allegedly the first-ever metaverse protest against consumerism and commercialization. Several avatars assembled outside Samsung’s flagship store in the “Decentraland” metaverse, carrying picket signs with the text ‘I Have A Scream’ on them and matching red shirts that read ‘Moneyfestation’. 
• Ukraine: Ukrainian-founded metaverse-entertainment platform MultiNFT held a digital protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the virtual island of Cryptovoxels called Original City. During the protest, digital avatars held up signs that said “Stop the War.” 

Hybrid: with elements of both. For example, a protest might be organised on social media and take place in both physical and online spaces, or a protest might begin in a physical space and move to an online one, or vice versa. 

Real-life cases:

• Spain: Trans young people mobilised during the pandemic for self‑determination in Spanish law; after a successful online campaign, Confluencia Trans decided to take to the streets of Spain on Youth Day to call on the government to protect the right to gender self-determination in “children, adolescents and youth”.
• Bulgaria (relevant for other countries): question of online participation and impact on civil society: “a legal uncertainty whether or not a meeting of a general assembly of an association, for example, in which some or all members are participating via online communication means, is legal or not.”
• Egypt: the case mentioned in the introduction of an Egyptian satirical group called Street Children whose activists got arrested because of their YouTube and Facebook videos mocking the government, followed by a social media campaign that emerged as a response in which other Egyptians protested these arrests. 
• Poland: online and offline protests against Poland’s abortion law organised by Strajk Kobiet, a Polish women’s rights social movement campaigning against curbs to abortion access. We repeat this one here to showcase the digital facilitation aspect and highlight the blurred lines between these possible categories. 
• #MeToo movement provided a powerful example of “transnational digital assemblies” in which the participants’ purposes and/or intentions varied over time with activities both online and offline with real consequences and change of attitudes.

 

 

 

 

Legal framework

 

The right of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right recognised by international, regional, and national instruments. These instruments set minimum standards for assembly rights in Europe and beyond, although their protections have been interpreted differently by courts and other tribunals. At the national level, in particular, the extent of assembly rights varies greatly from one state to another, in practice and in the law—in state-specific founding documents, bills of rights, statutes, common law, administrative regulations, and so on. The variations usually involve state obligations, restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly, and the duties and powers of law enforcement.

Against that background, it is useful here to review the General Comment No. 37 provisions that have special relevance to digitally-mediated assemblies. We have regrouped them by subject below and provided explanatory guidance to help assembly-right monitors analyse their local legal frameworks against these international standards.

General provisions regarding the right to peaceful assembly

Para 6: “Article 21 … protects peaceful assemblies wherever they take place: outdoors, indoors and online; in public and private spaces; or a combination thereof.” 

Among other things, this definition includes a typical street march or a protest in a public square or in front of a symbolic government monument, as well as meetings in private homes and both sit-ins and flash mobs in private shopping malls. At the same time, this definition includes digitally-mediated assemblies because of the references to “outdoors”, “indoors”, “online” and “public and private spaces” along with the phrase “or a combination thereof.” Therefore, this definition is broad enough to encompass even assemblies that are digitally mediated. 

Para 10: “[G]iven that emerging communications technologies offer the opportunity to assemble either wholly or partly online and often play an integral role in organizing, participating in and monitoring physical gatherings, interference with such communications can impede assemblies. … Moreover, there is increased private ownership and other forms of control of publicly accessible spaces and communication platforms."

The Internet “exists in an architecture of privately-owned websites, servers, routers, and backbones.” That private architecture has enabled people to assemble and express themselves online, and it has enabled technology companies to mediate the exercise of fundamental rights by their users. In a 2019 report, the UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association commented: “[P]latforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have become the gatekeepers to people’s ability to enjoy the rights of peaceful assembly and of association, wielding enormous power over whether individuals and civil society actors can access and participate in the democratic space.” Moreover, the companies generally operate with a commercial logic. As the social psychologist Shoshana Zuboff put it, the companies collect a lot of personal data “to nudge, coax, tune and herd behaviour toward profitable outcomes.” This can be inconsistent with the logic of digitally-mediated assemblies and the interests of their participants. States sometimes intervene in this private architecture, too, to restrict how platforms and other technologies are used in organising, publicising, or hosting assemblies: e.g., a state might order an Internet shutdown or make efforts to block Internet access.

Para 15: “A ‘peaceful’ assembly stands in contradistinction to one characterized by widespread and serious violence. The terms ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-violent’ are thus used interchangeably in this context. The right of peaceful assembly may, by definition, not be exercised using violence. ‘Violence’ … typically entails the use by participants of physical force against others that is likely to result in injury or death, or serious damage to property.”

General Comment No. 37’s definition of “violence” appears to exclude the possibility of a non-peaceful assembly occurring in a digital space, because the definition “typically entails the use […] of physical force […].” However, there are examples of online protests resulting in Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on particular websites to take them down for a period of time to make a social or political point . That could cause lost profits for the owners and even harm to the website users, ultimately producing “serious damage to property” or, in extreme cases, “injury or death.” Imagine, for instance, a DoS attack shutting down a bank’s website and preventing access to its client accounts in order to protest economic inequalities, or a DoS attack shutting down a government website that provides essential health services in order to protest the poor working conditions of healthcare workers. 

Para 31: “[B]usiness enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly of, for example, communities affected by their activities and of their employees. Private entities and broader society may be expected to accept some level of disruption as a result of the exercise of the right.” 

This is basically an extension of various concepts outlined in the 2011 UN document “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.” This document declares that the responsibility to respect human rights applies to all businesses independent of state human rights obligations, and that such responsibility entails not only an effort to support and promote human rights but also to prevent, mitigate, and remediate any harm caused: e.g., a social media company mediating an online assembly is expected to respect the human rights of ethnic minorities who are using its platform to assemble and affirm group identity, even if doing so would, in some way, be disruptive for the company (if, say, the online assembly becomes so popular or controversial that it requires the deployment of additional company resources to keep the servers running, to moderate content, etc.). 

State obligations to protect digitally-mediated assemblies

Para 13: “Although the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly is normally understood to pertain to the physical gathering of persons, article 21 protection also extends to remote participation in, and organization of, assemblies, for example online.”

Clearly, this definition has special relevance to digitally-mediated assemblies because of the explicit “remote” and “online” references. The language also captures the reality of the modern assembly environment, as noted in a 2019 report by the UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association: “Individuals can now use online spaces to participate in a virtually connected civil society,” and in fact “[t]here are numerous examples across the globe which demonstrate the power of digital technology in the hands of people looking to come together to advance democracy, peace and development.” In recent years, for instance, women have remotely gathered to exchange stories and experiences about sexual assault and harassment. Indeed, remote participation in, and organisation of assemblies can be especially important for individuals and groups in vulnerable positions. 

Para 24: “States parties have certain positive duties to facilitate peaceful assemblies and to make it possible for participants to achieve their objectives. States must thus promote an enabling environment for the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly without discrimination, and put in place a legal and institutional framework within which the right can be exercised effectively.”

With respect to promoting an enabling environment, a state should act to ensure that technology companies do not restrict access to an online assembly. Additionally, because Internet access is a precondition of participation in an online assembly, a state ideally should promote digital literacy as well as Internet accessibility, affordability and reliability. With respect to putting in place an effective legal and institutional framework, a state might choose directly to acknowledge and protect digitally-mediated assemblies through one or more legal sources, or a state might protect certain aspects of such assemblies through laws governing ISPs, artificial intelligence, the spread of misinformation and disinformation, electronic surveillance, etc. A state might also repeal, or not introduce in the first place, laws that unduly restrict or undermine the right to peaceful assembly in both offline and online spaces.

Para 34: “Many associated activities happen online or otherwise rely upon digital services. Such activities are also protected under article 21. States parties must not, for example, block or hinder Internet connectivity in relation to peaceful assemblies. The same applies to geotargeted or technology-specific interference with connectivity or access to content. States should ensure that the activities of Internet service providers and intermediaries do not unduly restrict assemblies or the privacy of assembly participants. Any restrictions on the operation of information dissemination systems must conform with the tests for restrictions on freedom of expression.”

This language reflects concerns captured well by various UN special rapporteurs and by the UN Human Rights Council. First, for example, in a 2011 report the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression pointed out an “emerging trend of timed (or ‘just-in-time’) blocking to prevent users from accessing or disseminating information at key political moments, such as elections, times of social unrest,” etc. Second, in a 2019 report the UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association registered his “concern about the variety of measures and tactics that are used by States to control and impede access to and use of digital technology for the exercise of the rights to freedom of assembly and of association.” Third, in a 2020 report the UN Human Rights Council registered the same concern and said such measures and tactics were having “an impact on the ability to organize and conduct assemblies.” Examples include laws criminalising certain online content and chilling advocacy and mobilisation, as well as efforts to shut down access to communications networks and services. A notorious example came in 2011 when Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, trying to quell street protests being organised on social media, ordered the country’s ISPs to go offline. 

Restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly 

Para 61: “While the collection of relevant information and data by authorities may under certain circumstances assist the facilitation of assemblies, it must not result in suppressing rights or creating a chilling effect. Any information gathering, whether by public or private entities, … and the way in which data are collected, shared, retained and accessed, must strictly conform to applicable international standards … and may never be aimed at intimidating or harassing participants or would-be participants in assemblies.”

Para 62: “The mere fact that a particular assembly takes place in public does not mean that participants’ privacy cannot be violated. … The same applies to the monitoring of social media to glean information about participation in peaceful assemblies. Independent and transparent scrutiny and oversight must be exercised over the decision to collect the personal information and data of those engaged in peaceful assemblies and over its sharing or retention.”

Para 99: “Surveillance of those involved in assemblies and other data-gathering activities may violate their right to privacy.”

At the heart of these provisions is a concern expressed , e.g., in a recent poll in the United Kingdom, which found that one third of respondents were not inclined to participate in a protest because of worries about their privacy. The underlying problem is that unnecessary and disproportionate surveillance measures have been increasing, and legal requirements on technology companies to store personal data and register SIM cards on an indiscriminate basis can allow authorities to access data that is neither relevant nor necessary to address a crime or specific threat. As a result, uncertainty around how the data will be accessed and shared can chill a person’s willingness to exercise her right to peaceful assembly. That can be especially true if the person is part of a vulnerable population: e.g., imagine that an immigrant woman wants to participate anonymously in an online assembly in support of abortion rights, but she is aware that states and technology companies share data; as a result, she might not feel comfortable participating at all. 

Notification of assemblies

Para 72: “Any notification regime should exclude assemblies for which the impact of a gathering on others can reasonably be expected to be minimal, for example because of its nature, location or limited size or duration.”

Different types of protected assemblies may entail different types of regulation or even none at all. Assemblies taking place partly or wholly online are not expected to generate the same impact on security, public order, etc., as assemblies taking place in physical spaces. This is more evident when online gatherings happen spontaneously without prior planning. For this reason, online assemblies should not be subject to legal regimes designed for the regulation of physical assemblies, such as the obligation of prior notification.

Duties and powers of law enforcement agencies

Para 81: “Law enforcement agencies must be alert to the potentially discriminatory impacts of certain policing tactics, including in the context of new technologies, and must address them.”

Remote participation in assemblies can be especially important for individuals and groups in vulnerable positions, so the burdens of indiscriminate data collection and mass electronic surveillance of digitally-based assemblies can fall disproportionately on ethnic minorities, women, persons with disabilities, etc. In addition, particularly for online and hybrid assemblies, the use of facial recognition technology is a major concern. As the UN high commissioner for human rights observed in a 2020 report, these technologies “may perpetuate and amplify discrimination,” because they can be used to profile people on the basis of characteristics like ethnicity, race, national origin, and gender. Moreover, the accuracy of these technologies can depend on skin colour or gender, often with lower accuracy rates for dark-skinned people and women.

 

 

 

Monitoring digitally-mediated assemblies

 

The purpose of this Guide is to give guidance on how to collect data about digitally-mediated assemblies in order to provide greater understanding of how they take place and the extent to which they are enabled, facilitated and protected by governmental and private actors.

Digitally-mediated assemblies can be easier to organise, they can reduce both physical dangers and geographical barriers and they can simplify administrative procedures. 

On the other hand, digitally-mediated assemblies can be disrupted by platform content moderation, they can be weakened by the digital divide and network access problems and they can also be undermined by the viral spread of online misinformation. In addition, there are several discrete issues that are challenging to address when monitoring digitally-mediated assemblies: 

Synchronicity

The concept of synchronicity for physical assemblies refers to the general idea that participants are in the same location at the same time, typically for the same purposes. This concept can be difficult to apply to digitally-based assemblies because synchronicity can be diluted by the online nature of a gathering that has peaks and valleys in its level of participation over time. In other words, not all users may be present and posting contemporaneously, especially for hashtag-driven assemblies.

Definition of “violence”

Another issue is how the concept of peaceful applies to digitally-mediated assemblies. General Comment No. 37’s definition of “violence” appears to exclude the possibility of a non-peaceful assembly occurring in a digital space, because the definition “typically entails the use […] of physical force […].” But what if, for example, an online assembly results in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on a particular website, and it causes lost profits for the site owners and harm to its users? It is not clear if that could qualify, under para. 15 of the General Comment, as “serious damage to property” and therefore non-peaceful.

Evaluation of the behaviour of platforms

Yet another issue that may present challenges is how best to evaluate the behaviour of platforms. The basic problem here is that many of them – companies like Facebook and Twitter – are not transparent about their content-moderation practices or algorithms. They wield enormous power over the democratic space, but that power is basically private in nature. The companies are able, for the most part, to be no more transparent than they want to be. So, what kinds of obligations could/should be imposed on these privately owned but democratically critical digital intermediaries?

Possible monitoring methodologies 

To explore these and related matters, we propose multiple methodologies that can be employed and possible questions to guide them.

Documentary research

Reviewing relevant laws, regulations, judicial decisions, reports, comments, recommendations, analyses, etc.—all from governmental and non-governmental sources. Consider, for example, reports by UN special rapporteurs and analyses produced by civil society organisations, as well as current and proposed laws/regulations at the national, regional, and international levels. The focus of the research should be guided, as appropriate, by the questions set out below.

Interviews

Conducting semi-structured individual interviews on country level with key subjects, including organisers of digitally-mediated assemblies, participants in them, representatives of government, representatives of social media and technology companies, representatives of human rights organisations, and journalists. Semi-structured interviews can be useful when research is exploratory (as it is here) because they offer flexibility to both the interviewer and interviewee, allowing them to interact more extemporaneously if need be. For example, if the interviewee answers a question very briefly, you may use cues or prompts to encourage the interviewee to elaborate and respond in more detail or to consider the question in a different light. The interviews should be based on the questions set out below, and their structure is meant to explore key issues while allowing room for such open-ended exchanges.

Observations

Conducting structured observations of selected digitally-mediated assemblies, with a focus on digitally-based (aka “online”) assemblies. In such observations an event is monitored in its natural setting and recorded by an independent researcher. The observations are structured in the sense that they are guided by a set of questions meant to yield specific types of data. In this context, the observations will occur on publicly accessible social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, etc., and on publicly accessible news sites, petition platforms, and entertainment and gaming platforms, as PromoLex used in its recent pilot project. Monitors could observe assemblies in real time, or they could observe past assemblies whose content remains online—extracting and saving content that is relevant. For example, if you are observing an online assembly in real time on Twitter, you may identify one or more hashtags associated with it and extract/save tweets (e.g., through screenshots) that are relevant to the set of questions and useful to report on (e.g., What messages were conveyed through the assembly? Who participated in it? Etc.). Again, the focus of the observations should be guided by the questions set out below.

Case studies

Preparing one or more case studies to illustrate how digitally-mediated assemblies take place in a country and the extent to which they are enabled, facilitated, and protected by governmental and private actors. The focus of the case studies should be guided by the questions set out below, basically using the case studies to explore one or more of the questions in detail. Case studies are quite useful to capture an in-depth appreciation of an issue and generally to address how, what, and why questions about it—whether a case is selected because it is unique or because it is typical. Good examples can be found in the report “The Future of Freedom of Assembly in North Macedonia in the Digital Era,” produced by the Macedonian Young Lawyers Association.

Innovative instruments

You may also use or develop software applications to enable the collection of data about digitally-mediated assemblies. One such application, for example, is Brandwatch, formerly Crimson Hexagon, which can track online events and/or conversations to provide insights (in this context, insights about an assembly’s stated purpose, its organisers and participants, its key messages, etc.). Also, you may use or develop applications to enable monitors to report their observations of an assembly, as PromoLex did, and/or to allow stakeholders (organisers, participants, government representatives, etc.) to report their experiences related to an assembly. Similarly, you may develop a mobile application to provide information to participants during an assembly (e.g., regarding their rights) and/or to enable participants to report abuses and/or restrictions by public and private authorities.

Tips for monitoring and data-gathering

• The type of data gathered to help better understand the true nature of a digitally-mediated assembly will be best obtained through interviews, observations, and innovative instruments.
• It will be especially helpful in interviews to talk with organisers, participants, representatives of government, and representatives of technology companies.
• For observations, extract and save any content that is relevant.
• For documentary research, review relevant laws, regulations, judicial decisions, etc.
• Use interviews of local legal experts to develop a better understanding of the legal situation.
• Compare and use international guidelines and standards to alert local legal experts on the existence of such instruments. 

 

 

 

Questions to guide the data-gathering 

 

Describing a digitally-mediated assembly

1. Please describe the assembly in question and the digital elements it may contain (e.g., whether it was discussed/organised/publicised online, whether it took place entirely online or both online and offline, etc.). Try to briefly answer the basic questions: Who? When? Why? How? How many people? 

• Determine whether it is a protest against the government, an exchange of ideas, a celebration, a commemoration, a gathering to raise awareness, etc., by reviewing the content of assembly-related messages (for e.g., the descriptions and posts on the social media, or other digital tech they are using) and the intentions expressed by the organisers and participants. 
• Is it in a public space (e.g., a public square, a publicly accessible space (e.g., either physical such as a shopping mall or an online forum), or a private space (e.g., restricted access in a private building, home, or office or even a password protected Zoom conference)? 
• Determine how many people participated in the assembly by reviewing how many people were physically present for an on-ground assembly and how many people engaged with assembly-related messages online (e.g., liking a post, commenting on a post, or reposting). In case the monitoring takes place in real time, the number of people that attend the assembly might be counted and made visible within the technology that is used.

Planned vs spontaneous 

2. Was the assembly planned or spontaneous? Is the assembly part of some larger development, campaign, initiative, etc.? Or is it a result of spontaneous actions provoked by social media interactions or similar?

• To determine whether the assembly is planned or spontaneous, look for such evidence of planning as announcements, news releases, invitations, campaigning, and social media messages/conversations.

EXAMPLE: Think about hashtag inspired assemblies. Some hashtags are planned for weeks and organiser prepared a whole communication strategy around it in advance, such as #blacklivesmatter; others might just start that day when something happened on Twitter and/or Facebook like the above-mentioned introduction example from Zimbabwe #thisflag.

Identification of organisers

3. If the assembly was planned, who organised it? How did the organisers identify themselves? How many organisers are there? Where are they located? ​​​​​​

• Look for evidence of identities and locations in the “about” or “bio” sections of the organisers’ social media profiles (and the content they post) and in any news coverage of the organisers. 
• Sometimes the organisers and their locations can be anonymous/pseudonymous or otherwise not visible or known. If this is the case, please explain the challenge of identifying the organisers and note whatever is known or knowable about them, but do not speculate beyond that. 

Duration of assembly

4. When did the assembly begin and end (if it is possible to determine)? How long did the assembly last? Is it possible to determine when the assembly began and ended, how did you do so? If the assembly was planned, when did the planning begin compared to the actual assembly?

• In some cases, an assembly that takes place in a hybrid online/offline context can have a prolonged duration facilitated by the possibility of contributing indefinitely in an a-synchronic way (e.g., by participating in the debate at different time but under the same hashtags such as #metoo or #blacklivesmatter movements).
• During interviews ask about planning, because much of that process can take place in private, where observations of public platforms may not be fully informative. 
• Observe and record when assembly-related messages began to appear online and when they tapered off or ceased entirely. That said, it may be difficult to determine, in particular, when an online assembly began and ended, because it might have peaks and valleys in its level of participation over time.

Participants  

5. Who participated in the assembly? Did the participants identify in a certain way, e.g., protests of students, protests of care workers or simply rallying behind a cause? 

• Look for evidence of identities and locations in the “about” or “bio” sections of the participants’ social media profiles (and the content they post) and in any news coverage of the participants. 

6. How did the participants join the assembly? Online/offline? Did the participants identify themselves – and if yes, how? How many participants are there? Where are they located? ​​​​​

• Identifying the participants and their locations can be easy if they are visible and known, but it can be challenging if they are anonymous/pseudonymous or otherwise not visible or known. In the latter case, you should explain the challenge of identifying the participants and note whatever is known or knowable about them, but do not speculate beyond that. 

Geographic scope

7. What is the assembly’s geographic scope (e.g., with respect to its stated purpose, intended audience, messages, and participants)? Local, national, regional, international, etc.?

• Look for evidence of geographic scope in social media messages about the assembly and in the “about” or “bio” sections of the organiser/participant social media profiles. For example: Do the messages relate to local or global issues? Are the organisers and participants all from one country or from many?

Legal framework

8. Does your national legal framework explicitly acknowledge and protect digitally-mediated assemblies? 

• Check in which legal document the right is acknowledged (e.g., in the country’s Constitution, in a parliamentary law, in both, etc…)  What does it protect exactly? What are the state obligations, if any, to protect and facilitate that right? What are the restrictions on the right, if any? How does the law address the concept of a peaceful assembly, if at all? How does the law address the concepts of synchronicity and duration, if at all?

9. What other laws and/or legal provisions exist that provide an enabling environment for such assemblies?

• Consider laws that govern ISPs, artificial intelligence, misinformation, disinformation, and surveillance; laws that govern privacy/data protection; laws guaranteeing access to information; laws addressing the exercise of fundamental rights in privately owned spaces; laws addressing the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights; laws generally setting out state duties to facilitate assemblies; and relevant proposed laws or regulations. 

Messaging 

10. What message(s) were conveyed through the assembly? 

• Search for evidence by checking the supporting sources, by checking the author’s reputation, by scrutinising any accompanying photos or videos to determine if they have been manipulated, and/or by considering how reputable news organisations are reporting on the message(s).

11. Were the messages political, social, economic, religious, etc.? Is there any evidence that the message(s) contained misinformation or disinformation? Were any messages apparently illegal (e.g., messages involved incitement to hatred, hostility and/or violence)? 

• It is possible that the messages conveyed through an assembly will be varied and address multiple topics: political, social, economic, religious, etc.; if so, note all of the topics addressed. There is no need to reduce an assembly to just one topic.
• Review documents: relevant laws, regulations, judicial decisions, etc. to help you determine if any messages were apparently illegal. 
• Review a sample of social media posts and then assess whether any of them may violate the law in that jurisdiction.

12. What form(s) did the messages take? 

• Check if the messages were in one format: video, audio, text, photo, holograms, hashtags, etc.? Or did the messages come in multiple forms? 

EXAMPLE: In Moldova, on 04.10.2021, the Trade Union Committee of IMSP SR Telenești organised a flash-mob in front of the institution, in reaction to the information it distributed in the public space Emilian Cretu (presenter of the show Dora Show on Jurnal TV) about an employee of the institution. The physical assembly attended by about 50 people was continued online through a post with message and photos from the flash-mob that had over 400 distributions and over 1000 contradictory comments. 

13. Who created/originated the messages? Were the messages created by organisers, participants, both, others? 

• Determining who created/originated the messages can be easy if the creators are visible and known, but it can be challenging if they are anonymous/ pseudonymous or otherwise not visible or known. In the latter case, explain the challenge of determining the creators and note whatever is known or knowable about them, but do not speculate beyond that. 

14. Was there suspicion of trolling occurring and if so, what evidence can you collect to support your claim (e.g., sudden flurry of irrelevant/aggressive messages, bot-looking profiles, etc.)?

15. Who/what is the assembly’s intended audience? Was the intended audience made up of public officials/figures, private persons, government/private entities, etc.? 

• Analyse whom the messages were targeting (e.g. addressed to specific people or tagged on social media etc.);
• Interview the organisers/participants about their intended audience;
• Observe and review any names or institutions tagged in the messages posted/shared by the organisers/participants.

Measuring impact 

16. What has been the assembly’s impact, if any? Did the assembly effect change? Did it prompt a response from government or private entities/persons? Did it generate a wider conversation? 

• Interview the organisers/participants about what they believe their impact was.
• Look for evidence of impact in:

1. news coverage, particularly if it is reporting on responses from government or private entities/persons;
2. public discourse, particularly on social media, related to the assembly – where the assembly appears to be driving a public conversation. 

Counter-demonstrations 

17. In case the assembly in question was a protest, be it offline and/or online, did any counter-demonstrations occur? If so, who organised them and participated in them? What message(s) were conveyed? Were any messages apparently illegal (e.g., messages involved threats or incitement to hatred, hostility and/or violence)? Is there evidence that the counter-demonstrators sought support or protection from the state? Is there any evidence that the counter-demonstrators disrupted the assembly?

• Review documents: relevant laws, regulations, judicial decisions, etc. to help you determine if any counter-demonstration messages were apparently illegal. 
• Review a sample of social media posts and then assess whether any of them may violate the law in that jurisdiction.
• Look for evidence of identities and locations in the “about” or “bio” sections of the organiser/participant social media profiles (and the content they post) and in any news coverage of the organisers/participants. 
• Identifying the organisers/participants and their locations can be easy if they are visible and known, but it can be challenging if they are anonymous/pseudonymous or otherwise not visible or known. In the latter case, explain the challenge of identifying the organisers/participants and note whatever is known or knowable about them, but do not speculate beyond that. 
• Conduct interviews of organisers, participants, and government officials to determine whether the counter-demonstrators sought support or protection from the state (e.g., by asking the government to communicate with social media companies to ensure that they did not unduly restrict the assembly). 
• Review social media messages and news coverage of the assembly to determine if the counter-demonstrators disrupted the assembly (e.g. by conducting a synchronised Denial of Service attack to slow down traffic to a site used by the assembly organisers/participants).

Use of digital technologies and social media

18. Which social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, etc.) or other tools and technologies (e.g. mobile devices, specific software and/or platforms etc.) were used to organise/start/publicise the assembly? How were they used? 

• During interviews ask about methods of organising and communicating, because much of that process can take place in private, where observations of public platforms may not be fully informative. 
• Review social media messages and news coverage of the assembly to determine how technologies were used to publicise the assembly. 
• Observe assemblies in real time or observe past assemblies whose content remains online – extracting and saving content that is relevant.

19. Is there any evidence of new or innovative uses of technologies in organising, publicising, or hosting the assembly? 

20. Did the organisers/participants use new or existing platforms, applications, services, devices, etc.? 

21. What advantages, if any, did the technologies provide to the organisers and participants (with respect to organising, publicising, and hosting)?

• Assess if the technologies made the assembly easier to organise (for e.g., if there were some limitations for offline assembly)? Did the technologies reduce physical dangers and geographical barriers? Did the technologies simplify administrative procedures?

22. What challenges, if any, did the technologies pose to the organisers and participants (with respect to organising, publicising, and hosting)?

23. Was the assembly disrupted by platform content moderation? Was the assembly weakened by the digital divide and network access problems? Was the assembly undermined by the viral spread of online misinformation? Was the privacy of the assembly attendees violated?

EXAMPLE: In Azerbaijan, the Criminal Code set forth criminal responsibility for dissemination of information (including online and social media) that damages the honor and dignity of a person.  

Role of technology companies

24. Is there any evidence that the technology companies moderated the messages and activities that were part of the assembly? 

• Check if the companies took down content. Did the companies limit access to content? Did the companies restrict the ability to post? Did the companies suspend users? Did the companies deactivate users?

EXAMPLE: You can try obtaining information through request for access to public information sent to particular institution/body, to ask them whether they have sent official request to any company (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) to take some action against a person or an entity (e.g. to block the user account of a person).

25. Is there any evidence that the technology companies acted on their responsibility to respect human rights in digitally mediating the assembly? 

• Analyse what actions were taken, if any? What were their stated reasons? Did the technology company make any relevant public announcements? 

State interference

26. Is there any legislation or regulation allowing authorities to sanction individuals or organisations for using digital technologies to organise, publicise, or host assemblies on the basis that they are unauthorised or disruptive?

• Review relevant laws, regulations, and judicial decisions, particularly those directly connected to assembly rights, police and law enforcement, criminal code and similar. What is the source of the legislation or regulation? What is the scope of the legislation or regulation? Has it been enforced against any individuals or organisations? 

EXAMPLE: In Moldova, in September 2021, the organiser of a hybrid assembly was sanctioned by the police for insults in media only for exposing the protest banners on a Facebook page (literally saying ”Nina go to the trash”). The organiser appealed the sanction, which is currently under court trial. This is the first noticed case of sanction applied for a digitally mediated assembly; moreover, it is completely devoid of motivation and evidence.

• Use interviews of local legal experts to develop a better understanding of the legal situation. How does this compare to international standards (e.g., what is considered as unauthorised or disruptive, etc.)? 

27. Is there any evidence that the government interfered with the technologies used in organising, publicising, or hosting the assembly? 

• Check if there were Internet shutdowns? Were there efforts to block or hinder Internet connectivity or web access? How, if at all, were any interferences justified? 

EXAMPLE: In Azerbaijan, during the war there were temporary restrictions on internet through which assemblies were organised or coordinated.

• For more information please consult the following useful resources: Tracking of Internet Shutdowns by Internet Society and the work by Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition, particularly their Internet shutdowns and elections handbook, a guide for election observers, embassies, activists, and journalists.

28. Is there any evidence that the government acted to ensure that the technology companies did not unduly restrict the assembly? 

• Check what actions were taken, if any? What were their stated reasons? Did the government communicate with the companies about the assembly?

29. Did authorities use technologies to engage with the assembly? Did the authorities engage with the assembly by monitoring it, surveillance, data gathering, evidence gathering, communicating with participants, etc.?

EXAMPLE: In Georgia, during the demonstrations in Gumati against the Namakhvani HPP, locals alleged that violations of the right were recorded by installing devices suppressing communication signals in the area, complicating and, in some cases, making it impossible to provide or obtain information about what was going on in the Gorge. 

Digital divide

30. Were there any apparent barriers to participation caused by digital mediation? 

• Check for possible evidence of the digital divide: Were there any access problems related to economic status, gender, education, literacy, age, race, marginalisation (e.g., LGBTI, migrants, refugees)?

EXAMPLE: Technical barriers that limit or prevent access to computers in or outside the home, a lack of computer skills, as well as other factors that impede access to Internet. Often this disparity is anchored in an individual’s socio-economic status, race, age, ethnicity etc. This implies that people of a certain age or background cannot take part and are thus excluded from participation due to the digital divide. 

Interaction between online and offline components of an assembly

31. If the assembly had both online and offline components, how were they similar and different? 

• Similarities/differences in message(s), scope, counter-demonstrations, size, interferences, etc.

Privacy protection of participants 

32. What steps, if any, did the organisers and participants take to protect their personal and data privacy as well as the security of their digital accounts? 

EXAMPLE: use of encrypted services, multi-factor authentication, etc.

Media and journalist involvement

33. Is there evidence that journalists, human rights defenders, election monitors, etc., were prohibited from – or unduly limited in – performing their roles in the assembly? Did observers face interference, preventive detention, arrests, prosecutions, etc., in performing their roles? 

• Interview observers of the assembly, including journalists, human rights defenders, and election monitors.
• Look for evidence of interference in news coverage of the assembly. 

The guide in practice

 

ECNL's partners have monitored digital assemblies using the Guide in various countries. Please find their reports below on digital assemblies in: 

• Armenia - by the Helsinki Committee of Armenia;
• North Macedonia - by the Macedonian Young Lawyers Association;
• Serbia - by the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights YUCOM; and
• Iran - by Professor Azadeh Akbari from the University of Twente.

 

 

Lead author: Jonathan Peters, University of Georgia (USA)

Editors: Francesca Fanucci, ECNL Senior Legal Advisor and Peter Matjašič, ECNL Consultant

Contributors: Simona Ognenovska, Research and Monitoring Advisor; Katerina Hadzi-Miceva Evans, Executive Director; Andrea Judit Toth, Senior Communications Manager and the ECNL Assembly Hub

Design: Illustrations by ECNL with images used from The Web Gallery of Art, National Gallery of Art and Kailin Zhao

 

This Guide was prepared as part of the ‘Monitoring the Right to Free Assembly’ regional project, managed by the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law Stichting (ECNL). The project is made possible by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) through the Civic Space Initiative, wholly financed by the Government of Sweden. The Government of Sweden does not necessarily share the opinions here within expressed. The authors bear the sole responsibility for the content.

This publication was produced partially with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. The “CSO Meter: A Compass to Conducive Environment and CSO Empowerment” project is implemented ECNL and its partners: Transparency International Anticorruption Center in Armenia; MG Consulting LLC in Azerbaijan; Civil Society Institute in Georgia; Promo-LEX Association in Moldova; and the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR).

 

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