The year 2024 is marked by elections, with estimates that half of the world's population will be heading to the polls during this year. In the context of increasing autocratisation, it will be a decisive year for democracy, and civic space as its fundamental aspect. Civil society contributes to free, fair and peaceful election processes, but the election season itself often puts pressure on civic space. The elections of this year have already shown two paths: pressures on civic space increasing around and after elections, but also the immense power of civil society to mobilise and protect democracy. With so much at stake, planning for what can happen in the ‘biggest election year in history’ and working with CSOs to support them is all the more important.
How do elections impact civic space?
Effects of recent elections
Many elections that took place in recent months copy trends from the past. For instance, in Slovakia, anti-CSO rhetoric in the election campaign has led to anti-CSO policies. The new government announced plans to limit civil society already when sworn in last October. Since then, it has cut funding for human rights and proposed a new bill reminiscent of the Hungarian 'foreign agent’ law.
In some countries, recent elections have led to coalitions with far-right parties, which took or announced measures limiting civil society. Since the elections in the Netherlands in November 2023, the newly elected coalition announced significant cuts to development aid, as well as cuts of subsidies promoting participation and inclusivity. Some CSOs expect that these decisions may be followed by limiting the role of CSOs in civil litigation. Similar effects on public participation and funding are expected also in Croatia, where the far-right has also become part of the government. Apart from these effects, CSOs working with vulnerable groups and minorities are likely to face further obstacles, as far-right parties often target these groups with additional restrictive measures.
In restrictive spaces, elections have led to further suppression of civil society. In Azerbaijan, whose civil society already operates with severe obstacles, election season was accompanied by accelerated assaults on opposition and civil society alike. The unconstitutional presidential election in El Salvador is expected to perpetuate the incumbent government's repression of civic freedoms. In Indonesia, CSOs fear human rights abuses since the newly elected president was previously accused of involvement in human rights violations.
But 2024 has also already brought hopeful examples. In Senegal, authorities have been attacking civil society, media and opponents ahead of the February presidential elections. After the incumbent President attempted to postpone the election, civil society mobilised and managed to contest the postponement. CSOs further accelerated civic education efforts and election observation, leading to a peaceful election with a high voter turnout, which brought to power a new opposition candidate. While the run-up to the elections in India was marked by repression of human rights defenders and CSOs, the results indicate new hope for pluralism and competitive democracy in the country.
What trends can we expect before elections?
Restrictions on civic rights and freedoms
During the election period it is important to monitor the situation as several civic freedoms come under particular pressure. Notably, the freedoms of association, assembly and expression are often targeted. Most often, this pressure comes from incumbent governments attempting to tighten their grip on power by silencing opponents or critics. As a record number of people are now living in restricted civic spaces, the pressure on freedoms during these elections will likely be even more present.
In general, the pre-election period is characterised by increased instances of harassment and intimidation. In 2024, arrests of human rights defenders were prevalent in Venezuela, in Bangladesh, they were accompanied by violence and torture. Similar trend was also observed in 2020 in Malawi. In extreme cases, elections can be accompanied by widespread human rights abuse, including arrests, torture, sexual violence or forced exile, as documented in the period before and after the 2020 election in Belarus.
Freedom of assembly is often suppressed by restricting protests or arbitrarily arresting protesters. In various countries, the election period has been marked by bans on protests, and arrests or killings of people protesting electoral results or specific candidates. Recently, ahead of the presidential elections in Egypt, authorities cracked down on protesters at pro-Palestine protests, when they voiced opinions in support of the opposition presidential candidate.
Freedom of expression also comes under duress in the election period. This can take the form of direct threats or violence against journalists or bloggers, as documented for example in Belarus and Iran. Sometimes this violence is inflicted by state actors, other times violence is perpetrated by third-party groups, while the state fails to protect journalists and CSOs. In a less direct form, states may restrict expression to enact overly broad legislation, which can be arbitrarily used to silence opponents or suppress dissent, for example through the criminalisation of slander, as in Azerbaijan. The right to access information can also be endangered by bans on media websites or internet shutdowns ahead of elections.
Restrictions in the name of “preventing election interference”
With the claimed aim of ensuring transparency and fairness in elections, institutions may adopt legislation, which will unduly restrict civic space. The narrative of limiting foreign interference in elections can also be used to enact restrictive legislation affecting the work of CSOs at large, as well as media and social movements. Such a law was adopted in Hungary in December 2023. Establishing an Office for the Defense of Sovereignty, the law gives power to authorities to investigate any activities that might influence public debate, carried out by organisations receiving foreign funding. Due to its vague formulation, the law can easily be misused to silence critical CSOs simply on the basis of receiving grants from abroad. Leading up to both local and EU elections, Hungarian CSOs have been afraid the law will be used to silence them.
Electoral legislation aimed at increasing transparency of campaigns can have negative side-effects on CSOs, as the case of Ireland's 1997 Electoral Act has shown us. Its vague wording of ‘political purposes’ and overly broad application meant CSOs working in the area of human rights were effectively obstructed from receiving funding from abroad. Lobbying regulation can bring similar issues, especially when broadly applying to anyone, whose activities could influence voting behaviour, or enacting restrictions on political activity, which obstruct CSO's ability to engage in advocacy. Without adequate distinctions between business lobbying and CSO campaigns, the UK Lobbying Act discouraged CSOs from engaging in advocacy a whole year before elections. Additionally, environmental CSOs that carried out public campaigns in this time faced fines for not registering as non-party campaigners.
At the EU level, the Defence of Democracy Package, adopted in December 2023, aims to tackle the problem of foreign interest influence on European democracies. However, its proposal for national registries of foreign interest representation can easily be misused to stigmatise and limit the work of CSOs that are critical of national governments. A key issue is the lack of clarity on what constitutes interest representation on behalf of foreign governments and what falls under the definition of attempting to influence decision-making. Vague definitions invite overly broad interpretation, which can lead to CSOs that receive any funding from abroad face stigma and a restricted space for their advocacy. It is also important to note that restrictions on CSOs in the name of preventing foreign influence is a trend that tends to spread regionally from one country to another.
Attacks and polarisation during the campaign period
CSOs can also be affected by heightened polarisation during the campaign period. CSOs that carry out monitoring and watchdog roles in campaigns were attacked in Georgia in 2018. Various government officials then made statements aimed at discrediting them and undermining their work. In Hungary, CSO employees were surveiled as part of a clandestine operation, and the recordings were used as part of a smear campaign during elections.
CSOs that work on contested and polarised topics can face additional problems. Particularly the topic of migration is frequently instrumentalised in campaigns, documented in recent elections in Poland and the Netherlands. In Turkey and Slovakia, the election period was marked by frequent attacks against the LGBTQIA+ community. The climate is also expected to become a polarised topic in many 2024 election campaigns. As polarised issues get into the public spotlight, CSOs working on these topics can face attacks and smear campaigns.
A particular issue affecting both campaigns and election results in 2024 will likely be the economic insecurity resulting from recent crises. Trade unions warn that workers in several sectors are at their limits and the rising costs of living are unbearable. Economic uncertainty has been linked to a rise in populist and far-right parties, which are often antagonistic to civil society and tend to dismantle institutional safeguards to rights and freedoms.
Effects of (AI-powered) disinformation
A review of the information landscape in European countries has shown widespread occurrence of disinformation around the election campaigns of 2023. Disinformation is likely to have increasing effects on the (mis)trust in electoral results. Content generated by Artificial Intelligence can contribute to this trend, as identified in the Global Risks Report 2024. The side-effect of these trends will likely be increased polarisation and societal tension, which can affect CSOs working on contentious topics. Additionally, CSOs themselves are often targets of discrediting disinformation. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders notes that disinformation and violence related to elections have not only affected political candidates, often also election observers. At the same time, attempts to regulate disinformation can have negative effects on human rights, particularly the freedom of expression.
Trends during elections
CSOs or human rights defenders that directly participate in election observation face additional challenges during election time. In 2022, election observers were for the first time explicitly recognised as human rights defenders. UN human rights experts have pointed out an increase in harassment, threats and violence against election observers. In some contexts, election observation CSOs face issues with registration, access to funding or obstructions to their accreditation and publishing information. Additionally, electoral observers can be especially affected by legislation aimed at restricting foreign interference in elections. In some cases, such as Mozambique, journalists and CSOs engaged in election observation were intimidated, threatened and subject to violence.
On the flip side, organised civil society can contribute to increasing the fairness of elections. Apart from the 2024 example in Senegal, in Guatemala in 2023, a peaceful protest movement protected the election results from being obstructed by elites. In Poland, CSOs trained thousands of citizens to be election observers, as well as encouraged voter turnout and educated people about the unconstitutionality of the accompanying referendum. In Slovakia, civil society campaigned to educate youth about the importance of elections and raise their political knowledge in general. Additionally, the UN Special Rapporteurs note that election observers are key actors protecting civic space, by virtue of defending key civil rights and freedoms in the context of elections.
Election aftermath and civic space
Further restrictions on civic space
Newly elected governments may take steps to curb possible opposition and silence civil society. Research has found that in some countries, the likelihood of adopting legislation restricting foreign funding increased in the aftermath of competitive elections. On the operational side, CSOs may see their contracts with state bodies cancelled or lose funding as a result of diversion of public funds. In the event that a new government will have lower standards for cooperation with civil society, CSOs will need to adapt their current advocacy strategies. The Toolkit for Advocacy in Restricted Spaces provides an overview of potential strategies, including alternative routes of influence, employing international mechanism, digital technologies or engaging the diaspora.
Excessive use of police force during protests
In many countries, contested elections have led to post-election protests that were met with police violence. In 2023 this was the case in Comoros, Mozambique and Serbia. In 2020 in Tanzania, people protesting election results were tortured and killed, after the 2008 election in Zimbabwe, people assumed to have voted for the opposition were targeted, leading to about 500 deaths. In the aftermath of the Honduras election in 2017, protests were suppressed by enacting a curfew, deploying armed forces and opening fire at protesters. Freedom of assembly can thus come under particular pressure after elections.
Election period as an opportunity
While elections can lead to restrictions on civic space, it is possible to mitigate their negative effects and use them as an opportunity. Elections are an opportunity for coordination among civil society actors. Some CSOs are already calling for increased cooperation on shaping upcoming political priorities. Further, several CSOs at the EU level are advocating to make civic space a central theme in the European elections. Ahead of elections at the UN, CSOs mobilised to call for increased inclusion of civil society in UN decision-making. For CSOs working directly on the topic of elections, this period is the ideal time to formulate key recommendations for a more enabling environment in the field, as detailed by Election Watch in the context of European elections. CSOs can also use the elections to get their goals on the agenda of political parties. In Ghana and Sierra Leone, CSOs were successful in engaging with parties in the pre-election period if they maintained political neutrality and communicated using evidence-based data. For CSOs working at the level of EU institutions, a guide by the Good Lobby detailed how and when to influence the political agenda.
Whether a topic becomes a central election theme or not, CSOs can use the election period for increased public awareness. News consumption increases during campaign periods, and especially for those who are usually less politically engaged. Strategic communication in this period can therefore help CSOs raise their issue on the public agenda. CSOs can make strategic coalitions with social movements or develop new communication strategies (see the guides by Liberties).
Even the effects of negative campaigns can be flipped. A recent phenomenon of ‘inverse giving’ shows that supporters can increase their individual donations in response to ‘their’ organisation being attacked, as a show of solidarity. In the UK, donations to a refugee rescue CSO increased in response to the organisation facing political attacks. This trend is particularly present among young supporters.
While election time can bring many limitations, with anticipation and preparation, CSOs can use it as an opportunity to connect with citizens and advocate for their goals.
How to support CSOs around elections
In order to protect themselves, CSOs which could become targets of pre-election disinformation should develop risk mitigation plans and cooperate with other organisations in the sector for a coordinated response. Some countries already developed systems to address disinformation with considerations for human rights, such as France's approach which involves researchers and civil society, or Ghana's human rights assessments. They can serve as good examples to be followed by other states, as well.
Donors can echo the requests of civil society and support their work during election time by funding advocacy activities or publicly supporting the greater participation of civil society in decision-making. In many countries, the resources available for election monitoring or advocacy in the field of human rights are limited, therefore election time is a good period to make more resources available. Some initiatives also directly support projects which mobilise voters in the election period.
In young democracies, international organisations can play a crucial role in capacity sharing and working together with CSOs towards enhancing their role in democratic processes. The UN Mission in South Sudan provided such training to local CSOs ahead of the first national elections coming up at the end of 2024. Donors and international organisations can contribute to the capacity building of domestic civil society in the areas of election observation and advocacy.
International institutions, international CSOs and embassies can help challenge restrictive legislation by bringing attention to international standards. Solidarity actions in other countries can also raise awareness of election-time repression and push governments for an international response. The public can contribute by donating to civil society work, volunteering and fighting disinformation by sharing fact-checked content.
Despite the alarming deterioration of civic space over the past years, civil society continues to push back. 2024 offers an opportunity to leverage the power of civil society during the election period. With foresight, coordination and preparation, it can drive positive change.